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Abstract
In this thesis I study a market comprised of a sequence of auctions where buyers can choose
to later resell any object they now buy. I develop a structural model of such a market
and show how the possibility to resell shapes equilibrium strategies. I then estimate the
model on data from classic car auctions. The model admits aggregate shocks to buyer and
seller wealth and that way matches the positive empirical correlation between prices and
the state of the economy.
Using a separate two-period model I show analytically that the resale option may in-
crease average prices as compared to an otherwise identical market without resale. The
same two-period model shows that with aggregate shocks resale may amplify price volatil-
ity. I then evaluate the quantitative importance of these effects in a number of counter-
factual experiments on the estimated model. Resale raises prices moderately but does not
lead to meaningfully more volatility. Allowing (counterfactually) for instantaneous resale
increases average prices and their volatility substantially. A second set of counterfactuals
reveals that centralizing trade lowers prices and increases the volume of trade, thereby in-
creasing the efficiency of the market. Price volatility remains unchanged in this scenario,
even with frequent resale opportunities.
An assumption in my model and several others in the literature is that bidders take a
stationary distribution of rival bids as given and don’t learn about that distribution from
one auction to the next. This is different from the canonical model of sequential auctions
in Weber (1983), where learning is present. I therefore compare the Weber model to a
model where bidders face a stationary distribution of rival bids in each period. I show
how equilibrium strategies differ in the two games and show that despite the differences,
the two games yield the same expected prices and payoffs.
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In many markets trade takes place through a sequence of auctions. Examples include
government procurement auctions, auctions for art, fine wine or classic cars, and a huge
variety of goods on online auction platforms such as eBay. Sequential auctions are also
a convenient way of modelling decentralized trade. For both of these reasons sequential
auction markets have been studied extensively in both the theoretical and the empirical
literature. This dissertation contributes to two aspects of sequential auctions that have as
of yet received relatively little attention.
Sequential auctions are a dynamic setting in the first instance because buyers who
lose an auction can bid again in future auctions. In many settings there is an additional
dynamic aspect, namely that successful bidders can use future auctions to sell an object
they just purchased. Chapter 2 studies this possibility of resale in sequential auction
markets using the market for classic cars as an example, where resale is particularly
important because classic cars have very low rates of depreciation.
Chapter 3 focusses on the information generated by the dynamic nature of sequential
auction markets and its influence on bidder strategies. When bidders have to track the
evolution of competition in the market, strategies in sequential auctions can become very
complex, which is why many models make assumptions so that strategies of bidders are
stationary. The chapter therefore compares the canonical model of sequential auctions, in
which players have to track how the degree of competition changes over the course of the
game, to a stationary environment.
The remainder of the introduction is devoted to a review of the related literature.
Section 1.1 discusses the theory of sequential auctions. Section 1.2 begins with a review of
the methods to estimate static models of auctions. Structural sequential auctions papers
build on these methods to estimate their models and are discussed next. Section 1.3 first
introduces the literature on the efficiency of static two sided trading mechanisms. Building
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on these papers a new literature studies the efficiency of sequential auction markets, both
theoretically and empirically, and is reviewed next. Section 1.4 covers auctions with resale
and related markets.
1.1 Sequential Auctions Theory
The first model of sequential auctions is in Weber (1983). The model has N players
bidding on M < N identical objects, which are sold one after the other in a sequence of
M auctions. All N bidders are active in the first period and only exit the game by winning
one of the auctions. This set-up means that continuing bidders are the ones who have not
yet won an auction and so the distribution of values among the currently active bidders is
declining over the course of the game. The famous result in the paper is that, in spite of
this deteriorating distribution of bidder values, prices are in expectation the same in each
auction and that the sequence of prices is a martingale.1
Said (2012) adds bidder entry to the Weber (1983) model. Entering bidders’ values
are drawn from a different distribution than values of continuing bidders since the latter
have lost previous auctions and must therefore tend to have lower values. This creates
asymmetric beliefs among the bidders about their respective competitors’ values. For this
reason there may be no symmetric equilibrium under a sealed-bid auction format and the
auction may be inefficient. The paper shows that efficiency can be recovered with an open
ascending auction format because this allows all bidders to learn about their competitors’
value over the course of the stage game auction.
Many papers make assumptions to avoid the complications introduced by information
release about bidders’ values from one auction to the next. The complications arise be-
cause bidders’ values are persistent over time. A different approach is to assume that
bidders each period draw a value anew, just before any one auction takes place, and,
importantly, do so independently across objects. Their value for one object is then not
correlated with their value for other objects. Following Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994), this
is often referred to as stochastically equivalent objects when the values are all drawn from
the same distribution. Since any one bidder’s valuation for a given object is drawn inde-
pendently from their valuation for the other objects, a bidder’s past bids (or their staying
in the game) are uninformative about their valuation for the objects at present and future
auctions. A justification for this assumption may be that objects at each auction are not
exactly identical and that bidders may learn the condition of the object just before the
1 Surprisingly, given this result, Ashenfelter (1989) finds that prices in wine auctions have a statistically
significant negative trend, although in most cases prices are constant. See also Ashenfelter and Genesove
(1992), McAfee and Vincent (1993), Beggs and Graddy (1997), and Van den Berg et al. (2001) on the
‘price decline anomaly’.
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auction (e.g. for used items that were identical when new but have different conditions
at the time of the auction). This also implies however that bidders have no persistent
private information about their value for the object, which is likely to be violated in
many settings. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) shows that under the stochastic equivalence
assumption, prices are not necessarily a martingale but may trend up or down, depend-
ing on the distribution of values. Said (2011) extends this setting to allow for a random
number of bidders and random periods of time between auctions. Budish (2008) uses the
assumption of stochastic equivalence in determining how best to combine several single-
unit auctions to create a market for multiple units. The paper compares the efficiency
of sequential to simultaneous separate auctions (in the latter case bidders have to choose
only one auction to enter) and of providing public information about other auctions in the
market to hiding it.
Zeithammer (2006) studies the amount of information about future auctions that bid-
ders take into account when deciding their current bid on auction platforms such as eBay.
Buyers in the model have perfectly persistent valuations but do not take the information
generated by competitors staying in the game for more than one auction into account.
Although not described by the author as such, this amounts to assuming a ‘mean-field’
equilibrium in which bidders do not fully optimise against the complex strategic environ-
ment but instead optimise against a stationary distribution of rival bids every period.2
Buyers are interested in buying one unit of one specific product, i.e. there is no substitu-
tion between similar goods. On eBay the number of auctions due to end at any given time
varies, which affects the bidders’ near-term option value of losing one of these auctions.
The author considers three different models of buyer behaviour that differ in the amount
of information about future auctions they take into account. In the first bidders do not
consider the number of auctions that will end soon. In the second case bidders consider
the total number of auctions due to end soon and in the third case bidders consider the
number of auctions only for the object they are interested in purchasing. If bidders take
the number of all auctions or auctions for their desired object ending soon into account,
they will shade their bid more the higher this number is. The author tests these three
models using data from eBay auctions for MP3 players and movie DVDs and finds the
strongest evidence for the third model, in which bidders take into account the number of
auctions for their desired object due to end soon.
2 This assumption was also adopted by Backus and Lewis (2019) and others in the structural literature




The structural analysis of sequential auction models builds upon identification results and
estimation methods developed first for static models of auctions. Guerre et al. (2000)
show nonparametric identification for the first price auction with independent private
values and suggest a nonparametric estimation method, which obtains the optimal rate of
convergence to the true distribution. For the case without reserve price the approach is
as follows. The objective of a bidder i with private value vi in a first price auction where




where F (·) is the distribution from which bidder values are drawn. The first order condition
for i′s optimal bid bi is then:





Which uses the fact that in a symmetric increasing equilibrium bi = b(vi). From this it
also follows that F (vi) = F (b
−1(bi)) = G(bi), where G(b) is now defined as the distribution






F (b−1(bi)) = f(b−1(bi)) 1b′(b−1(bi)) =
f(vi)/b
′(vi). Plugging this into the first order condition above yields a relationship between
values and bids that depends on the distribution of bids, not the distribution of values:




G(·) and g(·) can be estimated nonparametrically from observed bids. Each bid thus
implies a private value through the equation above after plugging in the estimates for
G(·), g(·), and the number of bidders N . This yields a sample of ‘pseudo values’, which
can in a second step be used to estimate the distribution of values.
In the Milgrom and Weber (1982) model of English auctions bidders have a weakly
dominant strategy to bid their value and the selling price will be the second highest valu-
ation among the participating bidders. Athey and Haile (2002) show that the distribution
of values is in that model identified from the selling price and the number of bidders alone.
The distribution of equilibrium selling prices is equal to the distribution of the second or-
der statistic from N draws, Fv(2:N)(v), and can be estimated nonparametrically. There is
a unique relationship between a distribution and the distribution of order statistics asso-
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ciated with that distribution, which can be used to find the distribution of values F (v),
see the estimation strategy in Roberts (2013).
1.2.2 Dynamic Models
Most models of sequential auctions discussed below have an ascending auction as their
stage game but the methods for estimating them are most similar to the approach de-
veloped in Guerre et al. (2000). The reason is that Guerre et al. (2000) showed how
to account for the bid shading term stemming from the non-truthful first price auction
mechanism while, similarly, estimators for sequential auction games have to account for
an (additional) dynamic shading term that corrects equilibrium bids downwards by the
continuation value associated with not winning the current auction. Estimation methods
for sequential auction games express this continuation value in terms of the distribution
of bids and plug estimates of this distribution into an inverted optimality condition to
estimate unobservable values. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-
Dengler (2008), and Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) develop estimators for dynamic games
but focus on discrete action spaces.
Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) was the first paper to estimate a structural model
of sequential auctions. The paper develops a model of repeated procurement auctions
and estimates the model on data from highway paving contracts. Each period firms bid
on a project for which they privately learn their cost just before the auction. Costs are,
conditional on publicly known state variables, distributed independently. In the language
of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) projects are thus stochastically equivalent. Firms that
win contracts accumulate ‘backlog’, i.e. projects that have not yet been completed at the
time of further auctions. The model allows firms to take this effect into account and the
estimates suggest that the cost of undertaking additional projects is increasing in backlog.
The auction format is a first price auction with reserve price. The dynamic nature of the
game means that different continuation values are associated with winning the auction
and with losing it, which enters the equilibrium bids. To estimate the distribution of
private costs the authors first estimate the distribution of bids nonparametrically. The
value function can be expressed as a function of the distribution of bids. The estimates
from the previous step can be plugged in to provide an estimate of the value function, and
find costs using the inverted equilibrium bid function.
Recently, a new generation of structural models of sequential auctions has emerged,
including Backus and Lewis (2019), Hendricks and Sorensen (2018), Bodoh-Creed et al.
(2019), and Coey et al. (2019). All of these papers use data from auctions on the online
marketplace eBay. Like Weber they also all assume perfectly persistent valuations but,
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rather than modelling information release from one auction to the next, make assump-
tions that lead to stationary equilibrium strategies. Hendricks and Sorensen (2018) and
Coey et al. (2019) follow Backus and Lewis (2019) in adopting a ‘mean-field’ or ‘oblivi-
ous’ equilibrium assumption. Bidders form their bids by optimising against a stationary
distribution of rival bids rather than a distribution of bids that changes over time and is
in part determined by the bidder’s own bid, as is the case in Weber (1983). This can be
thought of as a ‘large market approximation’. The idea being that in a large market, like
one for popular products on eBay, newly arriving bidders are likely to dwarf those that
a bidder may have encountered in a previous auction, and so learning from one auction
to the next can safely be ignored. In Bodoh-Creed et al. (2019) stationarity follows from
assuming a continuum of players, which will be discussed further below.
To illustrate the estimation approach given a stationary equilibrium adopted by these
papers, consider the following simplified set-up. The cited papers extend this setting in
various different directions. Bidders each period enter a second price auction without
reserve price for identical objects. Bidder i has perfectly persistent value xi. Values
are drawn from a common distribution. Bidders believe that the highest rival bid they
compete against follows a stationary distribution G(b¯). The equilibrium bid function is
then the following:
bi = xi − ηV (xi)
Where η is a discount factor that differs depending on the specifics of the model and the
continuation value V (xi) is as follows:
V (xi) = G(bi)(xi −E[b¯|b¯ < b]) + (1−G(bi))ηV (xi)
The first term is the probability of winning an auction given the distribution of the highest
rival bid G(b¯) times the payoff conditional on winning. The second term is the probability




1− η(1−G(bi))(xi −E[b¯|b¯ < b])
After plugging in the above expression for the continuation value, the bid function can be
inverted to yield the following estimable equation:
xi = bi +
η
1− ηG(bi)(bi −E[b¯|b¯ < b])
14
The distribution of values can thus be estimated nonparametrically given an estimate of
the discount factor, a nonparametric estimate of G(b¯) and of E[b¯|b¯ < b].
Backus and Lewis (2019) set out to estimate a demand system for differentiated prod-
ucts from a sequential auctions market akin to the literature on demand estimation from
fixed price markets. In a market like eBay, each auction is for one product only but
consumers are choosing from a whole range of products available on the platform and
therefore reduce their bids in any given auction by the amount at which they value the
option of bidding in a future auction for a substitute product. Substitution thus has to
take place across auctions, while traditional methods for estimating the distribution of
taste parameters from auctions consider a static auction for one product in isolation.
A bidder who loses an auction and does not exit the game (which happens at an
exogenous rate) gets to bid again on the same or a substitute product next period when
that bidder is active (while in the game bidders are active with an exogenous probability
each period). The continuation value thus depends on the matrix of transition probabilities
between products, the probability of being active in a given period, and the stationary
distribution of rival bids on all products. The simple set-up above is a simplification of
this setting with only one product. The eBay proxy bidding system is modelled as a
second price sealed-bid auction and so the equilibrium on each product is the bidder’s
value shaded by the continuation value of losing discounted by the probability of exit.
The authors show that the probability of being active while in the game and the
probability of exit are identified in the data. The transition probabilities between products
can be observed directly. To estimate the distribution of bids for all products one has to
correct for the fact that higher types are more likely to bid on only one or a few products
and exit early than lower types. Having done that, these estimates can again be plugged
into the expression for the continuation values and be used to estimate values from bids
using the equilibrium bid function. An additional complication is that the relationship
between values and bids for a given product holds only for bidders who submit a positive
bid on that product since some bidders may choose to wait for a more preferred product.
This means that in the present context the inversion from bids to values provides only set
identification of the distribution of values.
The authors extend their approach to allow for demand estimation in characteristics
space (rather than product space) with random coefficients and estimate that model on
data from eBay auctions for compact cameras focussing on resolution as the primary
characteristic of a camera. Reduced form evidence suggests that buyers do substitute
across camera resolutions: a substantial fraction bids on cameras with different resolutions
when bidding in more than one auction. The estimated demand system allows for a
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random intercept and a random coefficient on taste for the resolution of a camera. The
results suggest that on average resolution is the most important determinant of consumers’
willingness to pay for a camera but that there is substantial heterogeneity in how much
consumers value resolution. A counterfactual exercise using the estimated parameters
shows that if a monopolist seller of cameras with one specific resolution on eBay were
able to commit to future reserve prices (rather than commit only to a reserve price in the
present auction), the seller could raise profits above and beyond what is possible with a
reserve price without such commitment for future auctions.
Coey et al. (2019) introduce deadlines into consumers’ decision problem to explain
a number of phenomena observed on the eBay platform. In their model buyers have to
obtain a certain product by a given idiosyncratic date. They arrive in the market randomly
with different amounts of time left before that date. As long as the deadline remains in
the future, bidders place relatively low bids in the hopes of buying at a discount. As the
deadline comes closer, the remaining chances of buying the object at a low price are falling.
Bidders therefore increase their bids over time. When the deadline arrives without the
buyer having won an auction they will resort to a ‘buy-it-now’ option, which allows buyers
to purchase a good at the full price without having to go through an auction. The model
thus predicts that for bidders who participate in several auctions for the same product
bids will tend to go up. This prediction is borne out in the eBay data. Providing both the
auction and buy-it-now sales channels is in the model an endogenous response by sellers
to the described buyer behaviour.
1.3 Efficiency of Decentralized Markets
1.3.1 Theory
Static mechanisms
The literature on efficiency in sequential auction markets as a way of modelling large decen-
tralised markets follows a literature investigating whether static double auctions achieve
an efficient outcome as the number of buyers and sellers grows large. Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983) show that the sealed-bid double auction with one seller and one buyer
(so-called bilateral monopoly) who each have private information over their respective
value for the item does not in general yield efficient trade, which would mean trade taking
place whenever the buyer values the good more than the seller. Myerson and Satterth-
waite (1983) show that in fact there is no mechanism that yields efficiency. It turns out
however that this informational inefficiency is confined to small markets. Satterthwaite
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and Williams (1989) and Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) show, respectively, that the
double auction and the optimal mechanism both converge to the efficient outcome as the
number of traders on both sides of the market grows.
Dynamic decentralized markets
Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) show that decentralized markets can approximate a
Walrasian market even under incomplete information as long as there is a large number
of buyers and sellers and if there are very frequent trading opportunities. In the model
there is a continuum of potential bidders and a continuum of potential sellers entering
the game each period. They decide to enter based on their expected payoff of doing so.
While in the game, they then incur a participation cost each unit of time. Bidders and
sellers who have entered get matched randomly to trade through simultaneous single-unit
first price auctions with a secret reserve price. This is repeated each period of the infinite
horizon game. If there was a centralized trading mechanism each period, such as a double
auction, the large number of traders on both sides of the market would guarantee an
efficient allocation, even in a one-shot game, as shown in the literature cited above. The
decentralized mechanism in the present setting on the other hand will in a single round of
trading not achieve efficiency. Due to random matching, some auctions will be populated
by many high-value bidders and some auctions will only have low-value bidders. To win,
players may thus have to stay in the game for multiple periods and incur the associated
participation cost. This will lead to inefficiently low entry of bidders. The novel result
in Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) is that in a dynamic game with many rounds of
trading, also the outcome implemented by many separate single-unit auctions each period
approximates the efficient outcome arbitrarily well as the time between periods becomes
infinitesimal. The intuition is that as the waiting time (and hence cost) becomes very
small between periods, price dispersion has to shrink as buyers would not find it optimal
to bid anywhere above the lowest price they can expect to achieve by waiting. Sellers
accept this low price because future bidders will bid just as low. As the distribution of
equilibrium prices becomes degenerate it has to center on the Walrasian price or else the
market would not clear and there would be profitable deviations.
In Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) buyers and sellers play stationary strategies due
to the assumed contiuum of buyers and sellers. Since buyers are matched to a contiuum
of sellers each period, there are infinitely many simultaneous auctions each period and
buyers will almost surely not encounter the same competitor twice. The continuum of
traders also avoids the problem with entry, raised by Said (2012), that continuing and
entering bidders have asymmetric beliefs. Since each bidder is infinitesimal, entering and
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continuing bidders have the same information. Both types face a continuum of competitors
with a fixed proportion of entering to continuing ones. Beliefs are therefore symmetric.
Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2008) replace the participation cost with an exogenous
exit rate for bidders, which also has the effect of making them impatient, i.e. willing to
pay a higher price in exchange for earlier trade. They show that convergence to Walrasian
outcomes carries over to this setting also.
1.3.2 Structural Models
Hendricks and Sorensen (2018) take the theorem in Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007,
2008) to motivate a comparison of the outcome achieved by eBay to the limiting case of
full efficiency. For popular products there are very frequent auctions on eBay and the
platform attracts many traders. One may therefore think that it could come quite close to
this benchmark, although, as in any real market, plenty of frictions are likely to remain.
The model in Hendricks and Sorensen (2018) is similar to the one in Backus and Lewis
(2019) restricted to one good. An important difference is that, instead of one sealed-bid
auction per period, their model has overlapping ascending auctions that bidders sort into
endogenously after observing the current bid. As in Backus and Lewis (2019) buyers enter
at an exogenous rate and losing bidders exit at an exogenous rate. Bidders discount the
future only at the rate with which they exit. Moreover there is no reserve price. Inefficiency
arises only from the exogenous exit rate. Some high value bidders, who happen to bid
against another high value bidder and lose, exit before winning a subsequent auction.
Equilibrium prices fall when bidders exit at a lower rate, discount future auctions less,
and shade more. However, the price level plays no role for efficiency. The inefficiency due
to premature exogenous exit is present in Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2008), too. In
addition, due to the reserve price of the seller, the price does have an effect on efficiency
in the models in Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007, 2008). When frictions are large,
the reserve price means that the expected price can be high enough to deter entry by
potential bidders with values above but close to the Walrasian price, who in an efficient
market would be allocated an object.
The authors estimate their model on data from eBay auctions for ipads. Having
estimated the distribution of buyers’ values for an ipad, they calculate the Walrasian or
market-clearing price. In a Walrasian market all buyers with a valuation above that price
would receive the item. On eBay 59% of buyers with values above that level end up with an
ipad. The market thus falls well short of the efficient benchmark. However, the dynamic
nature of eBay does nevertheless substantially improve welfare: the authors estimate that
holding all auctions in their data simultaneously, and thus giving each buyer the chance to
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bid only once, would result in only 31% of buyers with values above the Walrasian price
receiving the object.
Bodoh-Creed et al. (2019) seek to understand whether a more efficient outcome could
be achieved on eBay by changing the trading mechanism to a more centralised one. Instead
of many single unit auctions within a given time frame, a number of them could be pooled
into one (multi-unit) uniform price auction. They estimate a model very similar to the
one in Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007). Each period a continuum of potential bidders
arrive to the market and choose whether to enter or not. While in the market they incur a
per-period participation cost and only exit by winning an auction. Auctions have a reserve
price but these are taken as exogenous.
The authors show that this model is a good approximation for a model with a large
but finite number of buyers and sellers. Specifically, if all players in a game with a finite
number of traders play the equilibrium of the limiting game with a continuum of traders,
for any  > 0 there is a number of players N such that the payoff a player can get by
deviating from the limiting equilibrium is smaller than . An assumption behind this
result is that as the number of players grows, there are increasingly many auctions per
time period, of which buyers can enter only one. The probability of encountering the same
competitor twice thus falls. In the limit this probability is zero as in Satterthwaite and
Shneyerov (2007).
Estimation again proceeds by first using an estimate of the distribution of bids to
obtain a plug-in estimate of the continuation value and then find values from the inverted
equilibrium bid function as in Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) and Guerre et al. (2000).
They extend these estimation methods in such a way that does not require observing the
exact number of bidders but only those bids that resulted in an increase of the current
price in the ascending eBay auction. They also argue that the eBay auction mechanism
diverges from a second price sealed-bid auction and show that bid shading due to the non-
truthful mechanism and due to the dynamic opportunity cost of winning can be identified
and estimated separately.
They estimate their model on data from auctions for kindle fire tablets and find that
64% of buyers who would receive an object in a fully efficient market also receive one
on eBay. This number is relatively close to the 59% found by Hendricks and Sorensen
(2018). The authors then counterfactually allocate the same number of objects through
fewer multi-unit uniform price auctions each period. They find that the majority of the
efficiency gain obtainable by centralization can be achieved by implementing half as many
two-unit auctions or a quarter as many four-unit auctions. Interestingly, this is reminiscent
of the finding in Satterthwaite and Williams (1989), using numerical examples, that a small
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number of traders on both sides of the market (six in their case) is enough to realise almost
all gains from trade in the double auction for bilateral monopoly.
Markets with search are an alternative to sequential auction markets of modelling de-
centralized markets with frictions. Gavazza (2016) studies the efficiency of a decentralized
asset market in a bilateral search framework with intermediaries. Using data from the
market for business aircraft he finds that frictions are substantial with almost 20 percent
of aircraft misallocated. Intermediaries improve the allocation compared to a counterfac-
tual without intermediaries but nevertheless, since they extract surplus, welfare would be
higher without intermediaries.
1.4 Resale
1.4.1 Auction Models with Resale
Finally, chapter 2 of this dissertation is related to the literature on auctions with resale.
Haile (2001) was the first empirical study of auctions with resale. The paper looks at
auctions for the rights to harvest timber. The rights often get sold long before the time of
the actual harvesting and the holders often end up subcontracting the job. This motivates
the following model of two English auctions in sequence. Players have independent private
values for the object. However, before the first auction they receive only a noisy signal
about this value. The winner of the first auction becomes the seller of the second auction
and the losers of the first auction get to bid again. In the first period players thus have to
adjust their bids for the difference between the continuation values of being a seller and
being a buyer. Between the first and the second auctions, all players observe their true
values for the object. This realisation of uncertainty between the two periods provides
scope for resale (the bidder with the highest signal may end up not having the highest
value). Players place bids based on their signals in the first round and in the second round
place bids based on their realised value. Signals are correlated with values, and so bids
in the first and in the second auction will be correlated. This has two dynamic effects
on first-period bidding: higher bids in the first period make it (i) less attractive to be a
buyer again next period (since competing bids are expected to be higher) and make it
(ii) more attractive to be a seller in the second period. Both effects mean that when a
bidder’s competitors bid more in the first period, the bidder wants to bid more too. The
first-period auction thus has a common value element to it. This implies that bids should
increase in the number of first-period bidders, which is testable. The paper finds empirical
evidence for this effect in U.S. Forest Service timber auctions.
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Garratt and Tro¨ger (2006) and Hafalir and Krishna (2008) also present two-period
models with resale. In these papers the reason for resale is not a realisation of uncertainty
between periods but bidder asymmetry. In Garratt and Tro¨ger (2006) a bidder with valu-
ation for the object drawn from some distribution with positive support competes against
a speculator who has a value of zero. Hafalir and Krishna (2008) is a generalisation of this
set-up in that two bidders compete who have values drawn from different distributions.
Such bidder asymmetry leads to inefficient equilibria in the first period, which in turn
opens the possibility for trade in the second period.
Lovo and Spaenjers (2018) study the auction market for art as a sequence of auctions
with resale. Their market is populated by agents with heterogeneous tastes for a single
art piece traded in the market. Buyers who win auctions become owners of the art piece.
Owners of art are subject to a shock, which the authors term a ‘liquidity shock’ that has
the effect of dropping the flow utility that owners derive from the art piece below zero for a
random number of periods. Owners can choose to consign their art for an auction and set a
reserve price for the auction. The reserve price leads to a fraction of ‘buy-ins’, i.e. auctions
without successful sale. The authors argue that for this reason repeat sale indices that
track the same art piece at different times it was sold, overestimate the expected return
on art because the hypothetical selling price in the case of buy-ins is not observed.
Buyers anticipate that upon winning an auction they can later consign and sell the
item. Willingness to pay is thus determined by the bidder’s taste and the expected resale
price. This generates the existence of ‘flippers’ who have a relatively low taste for art and
buy only when the price is exceptionally low, not in order to keep it but in the expectation
of selling it soon at a higher price. Agents with higher tastes for art sell only in response
to having been hit by a liquidity shock.
The model also has an aggregate state with two possible values, contractions and
expansions. All players are assumed to derive lower flow utility from owning art during
contractions than during expansions. The existence of a state creates a further group of
agents with values within an intermediate range who sell only when in distress or during
expansions because during expansions the expected selling price increases by more than
their value. The model thus generates a positive correlation between prices and volume
(both are higher during expansions), which is observable in their data from art auctions.
A difference between this model of the auction market for art and the the sequential
auctions literature discussed above is that buyers exit the market upon losing an auction
so that the pool of buyers is replaced each period. This leaves out intertemporal substitu-
tion between periods. Moreover, as demonstrated in Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007)
and Hendricks and Sorensen (2018), sequential auction markets in which bidders behave
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myopically, will not take advantage of their potential to increase efficiency as compared
to static one-shot auctions and will thus remain far away from the efficient benchmark of
a Walrasian market.
1.4.2 Related Markets
Resale and second hand markets have more generally been studied in a variety of other
markets. Lewis (2011) studies information disclosure in auctions for used cars on eBay
and finds that contractible information in the form of a detailed description and many
photos of the car helps mitigate adverse selection in this market. The author finds that
bidders take into account the information provided on the auction site when forming their
bid and also that the amount of information provided responds to the cost of disclosure.
Schiraldi (2011) studies the demand for new and used cars. The author extends static
models for demand estimation in fixed price markets to a dynamic model that captures
the fact that cars depreciate over time and that trade is subject to transaction costs.
Due to the presence of transaction costs consumers do not choose a level of quality to
purchases statically for one moment in time. Rather, they buy a car anticipating its
quality to deteriorate and to want to sell once the expected gain from doing so outweighs
the transaction cost. The author finds that such a dynamic model fits the observed
data from new and used car purchases in Italy much better than the static model. The
estimation method allows the author to estimate unobservable transaction costs and they
turn out to be substantial at 10 to 80 percent of the purchase price for different car models.
In the housing market transaction costs are also large and, while houses do not depre-
ciate to the extent that new cars do, neighbourhoods change and housing needs change
over time. Choosing a house to purchase is therefore a dynamic decision also. Bayer et al.
(2016) study the housing market using a similar dynamic demand model. They find that
a static model would yield wrong estimates of the willingness to pay of neighbourhood
amenities that change stochastically or follow a trend over time. The possibility to resell
a house is another reason why dynamic considerations are important in this market but
is not modelled explicitly in the paper.
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Chapter 2
Buying and Selling Classic Cars
Abstract: This chapter studies the interaction of resale, aggregate shocks, and decen-
tralized trade in a dynamic structural model of a sequential auctions market with resale
and aggregate shocks estimated on data from classic car auctions. The model matches the
positive empirical correlation between prices and the state of the economy. Only half of
the variation in prices over the business cycle stems from the direct effect of the aggregate
wealth shock. The remaining half is due to the dynamic decisions of buyers and sellers. A
series of counterfactual experiments shows that allowing for instantaneous resale substan-
tially increases average car prices and their volatility over the business cycle compared to
allowing no resale at all. A second set of counterfactuals reveals that centralizing trade
lowers prices and increases the volume of trade. Price volatility remains unchanged in this
scenario, even with frequent resale opportunities.
2.1 Introduction
Many goods can be purchased, used for some time, and then sold on. This is particularly
relevant for products with low depreciation rates, such as real estate, art, and classic
cars. Forward looking buyers value the possibility to resell for two reasons. First, it
allows owners to respond to negative shocks. Following a drop in wealth, owners of a
valuable good may want to sell it and rebalance consumption. Second, buyers may also
purchase a resale good if they perceive its price to be low in order to sell at a profit. Prices
for housing and for art have been found to be very volatile and correlated with the stock
market (Arefeva, 2017; Goetzmann et al., 2011). I show that the same is true for classic car
prices. Trade in these markets is often decentralized: Houses are sold through bargaining
between each seller and several buyers (Arefeva, 2017). Art is often sold through single
unit auctions, which are held at different times and in different locations. Classic cars are
traded in the same way. Such sequential auction markets can be inefficient as compared to
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more centralized alternatives (Hendricks and Sorensen, 2018; Bodoh-Creed et al., 2019).
In this paper I study how resale, volatile prices, and decentralized trade are interrelated.
I develop a structural model of a sequential auctions market with resale and estimate the
model on data from classic car auctions. Classic car auctions provide an ideal setting to
study these topics together. First, resale is important as classic cars are actively traded
while there is no production. Second, the trading mechanism is known and trade is
decentralized as each car is sold through an English auction and auctions are spread out
over time and locations. Third, the state of the aggregate economy can be taken as
exogenous to the market. While it is sizeable, the classic cars market is not large enough
to have substantial spillovers to the rest of the economy. The last point in particular is
important for estimating the structural model and may not be plausible in other markets
for resale goods.
The model captures the main aspects of the market. Trade takes place in a sequence of
single-unit auctions. Resale thus means that buyers who win an auction can, in the future,
choose to sell it through a later auction. Agents in the market differ by wealth and are also
subject to idiosyncratic wealth shocks, which generates a motive for trade. Random stock
market returns (taken as exogenous) on monetary wealth create an opportunity cost of
holding a car and aggregate fluctuations in wealth. Buyers submit bids in the auction and
are forward looking in two respects. First, they take into account the possibility to later
resell any car they may purchase now. Second, they know that if they are unsuccessful
in the current auction, they will be able to bid on other cars in the future. Sellers set
a reserve price and are also forward looking. They know that they will be able to try
and sell again if they don’t sell now and that if they do sell, they will be able to bid
as buyers in future auctions. Supply is thus endogenous through the seller reserve price.
The model is the first in the literature to combine a sequential auctions market, where
losing bidders may return to bid again in future auctions, see Backus and Lewis (2019)
and others cited below, with an endogenous seller continuation value through resale, see
Lovo and Spaenjers (2018).
I collect data on prices from classic car auctions and estimate the parameters of the
model using simulated method of moments. The estimated model shows that dynamic
incentives over different states of the economy are important for explaining price volatility
in the presence of aggregate uncertainty: Forcing buyers and sellers to use the same
strategy in all states of the economy would remove more than half of the time series
variation of prices in the estimated model. The remainder is due to the direct effect of
changes in aggregate wealth.
The first set of counterfactuals illuminates the role of resale in this market. In a
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counterfactual market where resale is not possible, prices are 8% lower on average. In the
data auctions are on average two months apart, which constrains the option value of resale
and thus explains the moderate magnitude of this effect. When owners can sell close to
instantaneously, average prices are 45% higher compared to no resale. In this scenario car
prices are also 25% more volatile over the business cycle because the option value of being
able to resell is higher in better states of the economy. This effect is mainly driven by the
possibility to speculate, that is, the possibility to buy at a low price in order to resell at
a higher price.
A second set of counterfactual simulations considers the changes that would result
from centralized trade. Due to the model having an endogenous supply side and aggregate
shocks, I can here study the seller response to centralizing trade and the effect on price
volatility, in addition to the demand-side response and the effect on the average price.
In a counterfactual market where buyers can bid on every available car, they will find it
easier to substitute between cars, and prices consequently fall by 34%. Sellers become
more than twice as likely to sell whenever the opportunity arises. With all bidders present
at every auction, sellers are less likely to face a low draw of bids, which would induce them
to hold out for the next possibility to sell, and hence the increased sales rate. Finally, in
a centralized market frequent resale opportunities do not increase price volatility because
there is little scope for speculation.
These results are significant for other markets where products are worth a substantial
fraction of buyers’ wealth and can be resold with little depreciation. A closely related and
important market is housing, where prices have also been shown to fluctuate more than
would be expected given the variation in fundamentals. According to my results, a big
part of the explanation will be buyers adjusting their current willingness to pay according
to expected prices in the near future. This will be exacerbated through the option value
of selling if frictions in the market are low enough. Helping more potential buyers to bid
on more available houses on the other hand would reduce the scope for speculation and
help to reduce price volatility.
Having laid out the related literature in detail in chapter 1, the rest of the introduction
focusses on connections and differences between this chapter and other papers. The rest
of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the setting and describes the
data. Section 2.3 presents the model. Section 2.4 describes the estimation method. The
results are in section 2.5. Section 2.6 contains a number counterfactual exercises using the
estimated parameters. Section 2.7 concludes.
Related Literature. Backus and Lewis (2019), Bodoh-Creed et al. (2019), Hendricks
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and Sorensen (2018), and Coey et al. (2019) model a market consisting of a sequence of
auctions in which consumers substitute intertemporally between goods offered in different
auctions. The demand side in the present model has bidders substitute across auctions
in a very similar way. Importantly, the supply side is taken as exogenous in these pa-
pers. Bodoh-Creed et al. (2019) and Hendricks and Sorensen (2018) explain that the
reserve price is not an important aspect of their market as reserves are set very low and
most items sell. This is different in my application: In the classic car auction market a
substantial fraction of auctions end without a sale.
Haile (2001) studies a two-period game in which the winner of a first auction can
resell the object in the second period. Resale may occur because before the first auction
bidders only receive a signal about their value and learn its true value before the second
period. In my model resale is driven by the variation in the pool of bidders from one
period to the next and by idiosyncratic wealth shocks. This makes the supply side closely
related to Lovo and Spaenjers (2018), who study the market for art. Their model also
incorporates resale at future auctions. However they have no intertemporal substitution
between auctions as their market has one unique art piece only and unsuccessful buyers
exit the market.
Other related papers include those on the housing market. In the literature on the
housing market it is common to assume that once a house has been purchased, the new
owner will keep it forever. Bayer et al. (2016) estimate dynamic demand in the housing
market, where forward looking behaviour is in part motivated by a resale motive. Resale
is however not modelled explicitly. Arefeva (2017) shows how modelling the auction-like
way that houses are sold can explain the observed price volatility in the market better
than the canonical model with Nash bargaining. The model does not account for resale
and instead assumes that, upon purchase, houses are kept forever. I show below that
depending on the frequency of resale opportunities, resale may amplify price volatility,
which is likely to be similarly true in the housing market as in the data in this paper.
Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007, 2008), Hendricks and Sorensen (2018), and Bodoh-
Creed et al. (2019) study the efficiency of sequential auction markets as compared to the
Walrasian benchmark. Efficiency in their settings would be achieved if every buyer with a
value above the Walrasian price receives an object. In my setting, where a durable good
is traded repeatedly over time by agents who receive shocks to their willingness to pay,
efficiency requires the ownership of the object to change quickly following a new shock.
Efficiency would be achieved if at any given time the players with the currently highest
value hold the object.
Classic cars are similar to other collectibles such as art, fine wine, stamps etc that
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have been studied extensively as investment objects. Pesando (1993) and Mei and Moses
(2002) study the financial returns on art pieces. Burton and Jacobsen (1999) discuss
measuring the returns on various collectibles and provide a list of studies that have done
so. Goetzmann (1993) and Goetzmann et al. (2011) find that the level of the stock market
strongly predicts prices at art auctions. Dimson et al. (2015) find the same for fine wine.
These papers argue that the link between the two is buyer wealth and I follow the literature
in focusing on aggregate wealth as the driver of price fluctuations in the model.
Dannefer (1980) studies the buying of classic cars from a sociological perspective and
describes in detail the passion owners have for the cars and the activities they engage in
(eg showing, touring, restoring). Although dated, the study’s observations match mine
described below.
2.2 Setting and Data
I collected a panel data set of classic car auctions held between 2003 and 2016. Worldwide,
there are many events and shows dedicated to classic cars. At these events collectors buy
and sell cars through auctions that are organised by specialised auction houses. Auctions
are an important part of the market, although classic cars can also be traded in private or
through dealers at fixed prices. The biggest auctions attract a lot of attention in specialised
trade publications and are interpreted as indicators of current market conditions. The
‘Classic Car Auction Yearbook’ (Orsi and Gazzi, 2017) recorded 5600 classic car auctions
in 2017/18. All of these (attempted) transactions are due to resale, since, by definition,
there is no production in the market for classic cars.
The auction format is an English auction. The auctioneer incrementally raises the
price. Any bidder who is willing to pay the current price can raise their hand. The
process continues until no bidder is willing to put their hand up. After the auction ends,
it is revealed whether the highest bid exceeds the seller’s reserve. If yes, then the buyer has
to pay and takes ownership of the car, which is always physically present at the auction.
At some auctions there may also be phone bidders. Before the auction bidders can inspect
the car but cannot test drive it.
From speaking to several of them, buyers are interested in classic cars for nostalgic
reasons, for pleasure driving, to stand out, or because they enjoy doing their own main-
tenance. Buyers appear to be primarily middle-aged and older men. Dannefer (1980)
provides a detailed description of classic car hobbyists.
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2.2.1 Dataset
The data come from two auction houses which publish results of past auctions. The
published results contain the model and year built of the car, the date of the auction,
whether or not the auction was successful and, if so, the selling price (but no additional
bids). The sample period is 2003 to 2016. There are three major auction locations where
both auction houses hold auctions every year: Monterey (California), Phoenix (Arizona),
and Amelia Island (Florida). Only one of the auction houses holds auctions in other
locations also. Moreover, cars sold at these major auction events have to be in impeccable
condition and represent the top of the market. This, together with reputational concern of
auction houses also cited in Ashenfelter (1989), should alleviate possible adverse selection
problems. I therefore focus on auctions in the three major locations, which yields a set
of comparable cars in very good condition. I drop all brands that appear fewer than 10
times in the sample and focus on cars built between 1950 and 1999. The sample has 4941
auctions, of which 4560 ended with a sale. The median price of these cars is $98200 and
the mean is $290600 with a standard deviation of $748300. All prices are measured in
constant 2002 US Dollars. As the standard deviation makes clear, there is a long tail of
cars that are very expensive compared to the median.
I supplement this auction-level data with aggregate data from the Classic Car Auction
Year Book (Orsi and Gazzi, 2017), which reports the annual average price of classic cars
starting in 1993 until 2016.
2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Cars can be distinguished by brand, model, year built, and the time of the auction. There
are 50 brands in the sample. The brand alone explains 11% of the observed variation in
car prices. There are 2567 car models in the data. For most models there are only a
few observations, in fact 1882 models appear only once. There are 63 models that appear
at least 10 times. Limiting the data to the 1066 auctions that are for cars of one of
these 63 models, the car’s model explains 74% of the variation in the price. Adding an
auction-year fixed effect to the regression, the explained price variation increases to 79%.
The remaining price variation is due to the condition of the car, special features, famous
previous owners, or the car having participated in big races. The car’s model is thus the
most important determinant of the price. Cross sectional variation in prices is larger than
variation over time, i.e. differences between cars are bigger than yearly price changes for
the same car. Among the car models with at least 10 observations, the highest average
price (USD 1037000 for the Ferrari 275 GTB/4 Berlinetta) is 55 times larger than the
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lowest average price (USD 19045 for the MG TD Roadster). The most expensive auction
year in the data is 2015 with an average price of USD 440700 and the cheapest year is 2004
with an average price of USD 82600, a factor of 5. This difference over time, while smaller
than differences between models, is thus still very substantial, which the next section will
explore in more detail.
For each car the auction houses publish a low and a high estimate. Ashenfelter (1989)
finds that for art auctions the mid point of the low and the high estimate is a very good
predictor for the selling price (conditional on sale), in line with theoretical results that it
is in the auctioneer’s interest to provide accurate information on the object being sold.
This appears to be true for classic car auctions too, as the correlation between the price
estimate and the selling price in my data is 0.97.
The secret reserve price is not observed in my data. For art auctions Ashenfelter and
Graddy (2011) find that the secret reserve price is about 70% of the low estimate. In my
data 95% of selling prices are above this level, and so it is plausible that the reserve price
may be similar for classic car auctions. The correlations between the price estimates and
the selling price are shown in the graphs in appendix B.
2.2.3 Correlation with the Stock Market
Figure 2.1a plots average deflated prices for classic cars and the S&P 500, both normalized
to base year 1993 on a log scale. The underlying average prices for classic cars are taken
from Orsi and Gazzi (2017). Prices for classic cars have more than quintupled since the
1990s and appear strongly correlated with the stock market. Figure 2.1b shows that also
the return on classic cars (measured as the annual change in average prices) is strongly
correlated with the average annual return on the S&P 500. See appendix B for the
corresponding regression.
Average prices could go up in part due to a selection effect, for example if in years
with a higher stock market owners of better cars are more likely to put them up for sale.
To control for this, I run a regression of the log deflated sale price on a model fixed effect
and an auction-year fixed effect on the sales in my auction-level data. The model fixed
effect controls for selection of models into years sold. The year fixed effect is the expected
log price difference between two classic cars of the same same model sold in an auction in
a given year and in the baseline year 2003. Figure 2.1c plots the auction-year fixed effect,
which shows a very similar pattern to the simple average: The expected price for a given
model follows the S&P 500 closely and tripled between 2003 and 2015. See appendix B
for regression results.
Akin to these results for the classic car market, Goetzmann (1993) and Goetzmann
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Table 2.1: Main Brands in Sample
Brand Price ($k) No. Sales No. Auctions
Median Mean SD
Ferrari 395 835 1508 674 772
Jaguar 86 198 917 480 556
Porsche 129 266 454 477 522
Mercedes 138 290 353 399 449
Chevrolet 65 84 82 340 391
Ford 48 187 589 183 183
Aston Martin 240 359 436 156 160
Austin-Healey 61 75 76 140 160
Shelby 353 471 416 140 140
Maserati 140 314 468 112 115
Other 67 134 210 1459 1649
Total 98 291 748 4560 5152
Notes: Top rows contain 4 biggest brands by number of sales, which are used for the estimation.
et al. (2011) use a repeat-sales index for the art market and find a strong positive correla-
tion between the level of the stock market and prices for art. Lovo and Spaenjers (2018)
argue that even a repeat-sales index of art may be biased due to selling decisions of the
owners. Dimson et al. (2015) find the same correlation for wine using an index based
on the sales of wines of the same chateau and vintage. My methodology is most similar
to the latter paper as both control for characteristics of the object traded (respectively,
the chateau plus vintage for wine and the model for cars). Repeat sales indices on the
other hand treat the objects traded as unique and compare the prices of the very same
object sold in different years. That way repeat sales indices control not only for selection
by observable characteristics (e.g. the model) into years sold but also for selection by
unobservable characteristics (e.g. condition and history of the car). As the model of a car
explains most of the variation in prices, the results from a repeat-sales analysis would be
expected to be very close.
2.2.4 Volume
The number of classic cars offered and sold, as covered by the Classic Car Auction Year-
book, has been trending up with some variation around that trend since the 1990s. The
fraction of cars sold successfully has also been going from 60−70% in the 1990s to 70−80%
in recent years. Total volume or the fraction sold appear not to be correlated with either
prices or the stock market. Both time series are plotted in appendix B. Even in the years
with the highest fraction of successful sales, more than 20% of auctions did not end in a
sale. For classic cars the reserve price is thus important, in contrast to the eBay setting
covered by for example Hendricks and Sorensen (2018) and Bodoh-Creed et al. (2019).
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Figure 2.1: Price for Classic Cars over Time
(a) Simple Average Levels (b) Simple Average Returns
(c) Coefficients Year Fe (d) Coefficients Year Fe
Notes: Data for figures 2.1a and 2.1b come from the Classic Car Auction Year Book, which has data
from 1993-2016. The definition in this book of a year is from September of that year until the following
August. For that reason the annual average S&P 500 is plotted for the same definition of a year in figures
2.1a and 2.1b. Figures 2.1c and 2.1d and the rest of the paper use calendar years. Data for figures 2.1c
and 2.1d is the auction-level data also used for the rest of the paper, which starts in 2003.
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2.2.5 Data for Estimation
For the structural model I focus on the top 4 brands by number of sales. This ensures that
there are enough observations per brand. These four brands are also more comparable
to each other and are more likely to be substitutes for each other than some of the more
unusual or less expensive brands in the market. Table 2.1 shows summary statistics
for these and other common brands. Figure 2.1d shows the results from four separate
regressions (one for each brand) of the price on a model and an auction-year fixed effect.
The patterns are broadly similar across the brands. Expected prices do not change at
the same rate in every year, but no brand consistently outperformed the others over the
sample period. The results section will address how well the estimated model can match
these different price paths.
2.3 Model
This section describes the model, its equilibrium, and the numerical solution method.
The end of the section contains a discussion and illustration of the model that makes clear
which trade offs agents face and how prices are determined in equilibrium.
2.3.1 Environment
There are N agents in the economy and J < N cars. Time is discrete and the horizon is
infinite. The future is discounted with discount factor β. Agents are either sellers if they
own a car, or buyers if they do not own one.1 By respectively buying and selling a car,
agents move between being buyers and sellers and vice versa. The total pool of agents is
stable (no entry or exit). Trade takes place through one auction each period. The auction
is modelled as a second-price sealed bid auction.
2.3.2 Wealth
At the beginning of period t agent i has wealth yi,t−1. Wealth delivers a random net return
rt, which is common to all agents and is drawn from a commonly known distribution, which
will be estimated. The value of the return rt is publicly observed at the beginning of the
period. Agents consume the composite good ci,t. Agents receive income mi and privately
observe the realisation of an idiosyncratic additive income shock i,t, which is drawn iid
over i and t and independent of rt with mean 0 and follows a commonly known distribution,
which will be estimated. Car trading takes place after rt and i,t have been observed, after
1 Agents can own at most one car. For tractability and because in the data I cannot identify owners, I
will treat owners of more than one car as several separate agents.
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mi has been received, and after ci,t has been consumed. Let A
j
i,t = 1 if agent i holds car j




i,t ≤ 1 ∀t (agents can hold at most one car
simultaneously). The price of car j at time t is denoted by Pj,t. There is no borrowing,
so yi,t ≥ 0. The intertemporal budget constraint is thus given by:







A seller who consumes c and holds car j in any given period has log-linear flow utility
ln(c) + wj . wj is common to all agents but depends on the car j.
Composite Good Consumption
Consumption of the composite good is assumed to be linear in current monetary wealth:
ci,t = ψ · yi,t−1. Although this is not the exact solution to the problem facing agents in
this economy, following results in Benhabib et al. (2015), I take it to be a good enough
approximation to the optimal consumption path, see appendix C for details.
Given the log-linear utility function above, an agent with wealth yi,t enjoys utility
ln(ψyi,t) from composite good consumption and individual wealth yi,t evolves according
to:






Recall that i,t is assumed to be drawn iid and independent of rt with mean 0. Assume
moreover that E[1 − ψ + rt] < 1. More details on the wealth process are contained in
appendix C.
State Variable Mean Wealth
From the process for individual wealth in (2.2) follows a law of motion for the average

































y¯t = m¯+ (1− ψ + rt)y¯t−1 (2.3)
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Where the second line follows assuming that N is large enough for i,t to obey a law or




i,t = 1 for all j and t, since every car is always held by
exactly one agent. Put differently, trading of cars only moves money between agents and,
while it does affect the distribution of wealth, it cancels out in the calculation of the mean.
Hence y¯t depends only on exogenous variables and is unaffected by the actions of agents
in the model.
Mean wealth y¯t is going to be the exogenous state variable of the economy. Agents are
assumed to condition their beliefs (to be specified below) on the current value of yt but not
on higher moments of the wealth distribution. Under the assumptions on the individual
budget constraint, in particular that 1− ψ + rt < 1, the state variable will be stationary.
y¯t is assumed to take values from a discrete grid S and the transition probabilities be-
tween values y¯t and y¯t+1 are Pr(y¯t, y¯t+1). For a given m¯ and ψ, the transition probabilities
will be determined by the distribution of returns rt.
2.3.3 Auction Game
Bidders
Each potential buyer has probability σ of being an active bidder in the game. Active
bidders privately observe their wealth at the beginning of the auction (equal to mi + (1−
ψ+ rt)yi,t−1 + i,t) and observe the public state y¯t. Next one car is drawn for the auction.
Car j has probability ρj of being picked. Active bidders observe the car for the auction
and its value wj , which is common to all agents. They also observe the number of active
bidders, denoted NA, but not their identities.
2 Active bidders then enter a second-price
sealed bid auction.
Seller
Classic car auctions have a secret reserve price. After all bids have been received, the
seller either accepts the selling price equal to the second-highest bid or does not. Unlike
in the case of an announced reserve price, it is always optimal for sellers to accept a price
above their value.3 The seller of car j observes the same information as the active bidders
and then chooses the reserve or lowest acceptable price aj .
2 In reality some participants in this market may know each other and learn something from the
behaviour of particular bidders they know but I assume the market is large enough that this effect is
negligible.
3 Appendix A.2 shows in a two-period model the difference in equilibrium between sellers setting a
reserve price equal to their valuation, as is optimal here when the reserve price is secret, and setting an
optimal public reserve price.
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Payoffs
Denote the expected value of leaving the current period as a potential buyer with wealth y
conditional on the current state y¯ by B(y, y¯). Similarly, let Sj(y, y¯) be the expected value
of leaving the current period as a potential seller of car j with wealth y conditional on the
current state y¯.
For a bidder who is the last bidder in the auction at price P , the payoff from winning
the auction is the immediate flow utility of the car wj and the continuation value as seller
evaluated at the current wealth minus the price paid for the car, i.e. wj + βSj(y − P, y¯).
The payoff of losing the auction is the continuation value associated with continuing into
the next period as a buyer, namely βB(y, y¯). The payoff for the seller is βB(y + P, y¯) if
the highest bid is above the reserve aj and wj + Sj(y, y¯) otherwise.
Information Structure
The direct flow utility wj is common to all agents and is common knowledge. Differences
in the willingness to pay for a given car j in this model are generated by heterogeneous
wealth y, which is private information. Buyers and the seller also consider the continuation
values of being a buyer or seller next period when forming their bid, which will depend on
future selling prices. In forming their beliefs over selling prices and hence the continuation
values as buyers or sellers, agents are assumed to consider mean wealth and its transition
probabilities only, which is exogenous and common knowledge. I thus follow Backus
and Lewis (2019) in assuming a mean-field equilibrium, in which players do not attempt
to update their beliefs on the value of continuing in the game from other bids. The
implications of this assumption are explored further in chapter 3. Therefore incomplete
information exists over private wealth only, which does not affect other bidders’ valuations.
The auction is an independent private values one.4 I focus on the equilibrium in which
both bidders and sellers play weakly dominant strategies.
Bidder Strategy
A bidder strategy is a mapping from the car j at auction, current private wealth y, and the
current state variable y¯ to a bid bj . Define bj(y, y¯) as the weakly dominant strategy bid of
a bidder with wealth y on car j in state y¯. As discussed in the previous section, bidders
have a dominant strategy to bid their willingness to pay net of continuation values. The
4 In Haile (2001), bids are correlated between periods because bidders receive a signal about their value
before the first period and learn their true value before the second period. This correlation introduces a
common value element to the first auction. This does not happen in my model: Controlling for the state,
bids are not correlated across periods.
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weakly dominant strategy bj(y, y¯) therefore has to satisfy the following equation:
wj + βSj(y − bj(y, y¯), y¯) = βB(y, y¯) (2.4)
In words, the bid bj(y, y¯) is such that the bidder is indifferent between winning and paying
bj(y, y¯) and losing the auction.
Seller Strategy
A seller strategy is a mapping from the seller’s car j, current private wealth y, and the
current state variable y¯ to a reserve price aj . The weakly dominant strategy aj(y, y¯) has
to satisfy the following equation:
βB(y + aj(y, y¯), y¯) = wj + βSj(y, y¯) (2.5)
In words, the reserve price aj(y, y¯) is such that the seller is indifferent between selling and
receiving aj(y, y¯) and not selling.
Beliefs
Let b¯j be the second highest bid on car j. If all players play the equilibrium strategy
as defined by (2.4) and (2.5), b¯j and aj follow stationary distributions conditional on
the current state y¯. In equilibrium players have consistent beliefs, i.e. their beliefs over
the distribution of b¯j and aj are correct given the other players’ strategies. Denote the
stationary beliefs conditional on the state by Gb¯j |y¯(b) and Haj |y¯(a).
Equilibrium
A Markov Equilibrium in this game is a tuple
{
bj(y, y¯), aj(y, y¯), Gb¯j |y¯, Haj |y¯
}
such that bj(y, y¯) satisfies (2.4), aj(y, y¯) satisfies (2.5), Gb¯j |y¯(b) = Pr(b¯j ≤ b|y¯), and
Haj |y¯(a) = Pr(aj ≤ a|y¯).
2.3.4 Value Functions
A buyer’s value function B(y, y¯) equals the expected value of leaving the current period
as a potential buyer with wealth y. A seller’s value function Sj(y, y¯) equals the expected
value of leaving the current period as a seller of car j with wealth y.
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Buyer
Define Bˆj(y, y¯) as the value of being drawn as an active bidder with private wealth y and
public state y¯ when car j is offered at the current auction. Since buyers are active with
probability σ each period, the buyer value function can be expressed as follows:




1(bj(y, y¯) < max(b¯j , aj))βB(y, y¯)
+ 1(bj(y, y¯) > max(b¯j , aj))(wj + βSj(y − b¯j , y¯))
)
dGb¯j |y¯dHaj |y¯
Bˆj(y, y¯) is the sum of the value of winning the auction and paying price b¯j and of losing the
auction, weighted by the probability of each event, given the buyer’s beliefs Gb¯j |y¯ over the
distribution of highest rival bids. See appendix C for the calculation of the expectations in
equation (2.6). B(y, y¯) is increasing in y but will be decreasing in y¯. The latter relationship
arises because expected prices for cars are higher for higher levels of y¯. Intuitively, keeping
y constant, it is better for buyers to bid against poorer competitors than against richer
ones.
Seller
Let Sˆj(y, y¯) be the value of being drawn as the seller for the current auction with private
wealth y and public state y¯. Let ρ˜ be each seller’s probability of being drawn for the next
auction. The seller value function can then be expressed as follows:




1(aj(y, y¯) > b¯j)(wj + βSj(y, y¯))
+ 1(aj(y, y¯) < b¯j)βB(y + b¯j , y¯)
)
dGb¯j |y¯
See appendix C for the calculation of the expectations in equation (2.7). Sj(y, y¯) is in-
creasing in both y and y¯. The seller benefits from higher y¯ because expected prices increase
when bidders are rich on average.
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2.3.5 Solution
A numerical solution of the model consists of a bid function bj(y, y¯), reserve-price function
aj(y, y¯), and beliefs Gb¯j |y¯ and Haj |y¯. The bid function and reserve-price function maximise
players’ payoffs given beliefs while also generating a distribution of prices and highest rival
bids. In equilibrium the distributions generated by the bid and reserve-price functions have
to be equal to players’s beliefs. A solution is thus found once a pair of bid and reserve-price
functions generates a distribution of prices and highest rival bids, for which these same
bid and reserve-price functions are also optimal.
To find the solution, initialise the buyer and seller value functions and calculate the
corresponding bid and reserve-price functions. Simulate many rounds of trade from the
bid and reserve-price functions and calculate the distribution of the second highest bid
and the reserve price conditional on the state variable mean wealth. Variation in the
second highest bid and the reserve price within a state will come from randomness of the
bidder pool (both the number of bidders and their wealth are random). Now use these
distributions of prices and highest rival bids as beliefs to calculate new buyer and seller
value functions. Calculate new bid and reserve-price functions and simulate trade again.
Repeat this until the value functions stop changing from one iteration to the next. More
details on the algorithm for the numerical solution of the model are in appendix C.
2.3.6 Discussion of the Model
As the buyer and seller dominant strategies (2.4) and (2.5) make clear, both types of
agents weigh continuing as buyers against continuing as sellers when choosing their bid.
The relative attractiveness of each at different levels of wealth will depend on the pa-
rameters of the model, most importantly σ, the probability of buyers being active and ρ˜,
the probability of sellers being drawn as the active seller. This is illustrated by the bid
functions in figure 2.2.
As can be seen in figure 2.2a, the bid function and reserve-price functions have very
similar shapes. For the same level of wealth the seller’s reserve price will be above the
buyer’s bid because of the concavity of the utility function in composite good consumption:
The seller gains extra wealth by selling, which at the same level of wealth and for the same
price, has a smaller effect on utility than the buyer’s reducing their wealth by buying.
For lower levels of wealth the bid function is first very steep before flattening off. This
shape is due to ‘flipping’: In light of their ability to resell any car they may purchase,
bidders with lower levels of wealth are willing to pay a large fraction of their wealth for a
car, expecting to sell it soon after for a higher price. The bid function starts increasing
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again at higher levels of wealth where bidders are expecting to hold on to a car that they
purchase, unless they get hit by a very negative shock.5 Figure 2.2c shows bid functions
for the same economy but with a higher probability for a seller of being drawn for any
given auction. This reduces the expected waiting time before a new seller is able to resell
after the initial purchase, and thereby increases the option value of resale. As the figure
shows, the shape of the bid function of being very steep at lower levels of wealth becomes
more pronounced, whereas at the highest levels of wealth the bid function is unaffected.
Increasing the probability for buyers of being active increases the value of waiting by
losing the current auction, which means that bidders will shade their bids more. Hence in
figure 2.2d the bid functions shift down. Moreover, the bid function for the car with the
lower use value wj is even decreasing for higher levels of wealth. Rich buyers prefer to wait
for a better car to arrive at the next auction over buying the current car, which provides
them with lower flow utility and, given the unit demand assumption, will preclude them
from buying the better car until they sell the present one.
The buyer and seller value functions (2.6) and (2.7) are conditional expectations. The
conditioning variables are private wealth and the economy’s state variable mean wealth.
When mean wealth is higher, the distribution of selling prices and of the highest rival bids
is higher. The continuation value as a seller is therefore higher because selling is more
attractive at higher prices, while the continuation value as a buyer is lower because buying
becomes less attractive at higher prices. This means that bid functions differ by state:
as can be seen in figure 2.2b, bids in the higher state are above bids in the lower state
because the difference between the continuation values as seller and buyer increase, which
determines the dominant-strategy bid, see equation (2.4). To consider price dynamics over
states, the dynamic incentives of both the buyers and the seller are therefore important.
2.4 Estimation
Having described the data and the theoretical model, this section explains the estimation
of the model. I first calibrate the parameters governing the wealth process from auxiliary
data. Second, I use the auction data described in section 2.2 to calibrate the parameters
governing auction participation. Third, I use the calibrated parameters together with the
auction data from section 2.2 (again) to jointly estimate w = (w1, ..., wJ), the vector of
flow utilities associated with each car, which I will refer to as demand parameters.
5 Appendix A derives analytically the bid functions for two-period models of sequential auctions with
and without resale and confirms this shape.
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Figure 2.2: Bid Functions
(a) Bid and Reserve-Price Functions (b) Different States
(c) Higher Seller Participation Prob (d) Higher Buyer Participation Prob
Notes: Economy with two cars, w0 = 0.2, w1 = 0.1. Baseline parameters in figure 2.2a: σ = 0.01,
ρ˜ = 0.05, y¯ = USD 3.8 Million
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2.4.1 Wealth
The goal of estimating the intertemporal budget constraint (2.2) is a wealth distribution,
which evolves according to (2.3) and is as close as possible to the empirical distribution of
wealth among buyers and owners of classic cars over the sample period. Data on wealth
comes from a separate data source, the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).6
The distribution of income mi and the idiosyncratic shock i,t are taken from the SCF,
restricted to households in the 85th to the 99th percentiles in terms of both income and
wealth. For the distribution of the common net return on wealth, rt, I use one half of the
average annual returns on the S&P 500 over the sample period. This corresponds to one
half of agents’ wealth not held in the form of a car being invested in the S&P 500 and
the other half yielding a net return of 0. Empirically, most households invest less than
one half of their wealth in the stock market but households have other investments, such
as real estate, which are correlated with the stock market. The assumed fraction of 0.5
invested in the stock market is meant to capture this in a simple manner. Finally, the
fraction of wealth spent on the composite good each period, ψ, matches simulated mean
wealth to the empirical mean wealth over the sample period. This yields ψ = 0.09. See
appendix D for more details.
2.4.2 Mean Wealth
Having parameterized the intertemporal budget constraint (2.2), one can simulate wealth
for a panel of N agents by drawing repeatedly from the distribution of rt and i,t. The
state variable of the model in a given simulated period is then mean wealth in this period.
The mean of simulated mean wealth is USD 3.99 Millions with a standard deviation of
0.8. Mean wealth has a very high autocorrelation at one lag of 0.94. (Returns are drawn
iid.)
Finally, to assign a value of the state mean wealth to each year in the sample period,
start with mean wealth in the 2001 SCF and calculate how mean wealth would be expected
to evolve from there according to the mean wealth process (2.3) specified by the model and
given the empirical average annual return on the S&P 500 in each of the years 2003-2016.
2.4.3 Prices
Bidders in the model condition their bid on the car j, their private wealth y, and the
aggregate state y¯. The model thus makes predictions about the distribution of prices by
car and by state. Estimating the model therefore requires a measure of prices by car
6https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm
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Figure 2.3: Mean Simulated Wealth vs Mean Fitted Prices
(a) Time Series (b) Scatter
Notes: Scatter plots the two time series from the left against each other. Unit of observation is one year
in both plots.
and by state. Having assigned a state to each year in the sample period (section 2.4.2),
estimating expected prices for each brand and each year yields a measure of prices by car
and state.
For the estimation I will use the top 4 brands in table 2.1 and estimate one taste
parameter wj per brand. There is heterogeneity within brands, which I will control for
with a model fixed effect. Section 2.2.3 describes the regression of prices on a model and
an auction-year fixed effect. The results from this regression for each of the 4 brands sep-
arately are plotted in figure 2.1d. While the model fixed effect controls for price variation
within each brand, the fitted prices from this regression averaged by brand and by year
yield a measure of the expected price for an exemplary car from each brand sold in each
of the years in the sample period. Since the model assumes a stationary wealth process
it will predict a stationary distribution of prices over time, while prices for classic cars
display a clear upwards trend over the sample period, see figure 2.1a. I therefore detrend
prices for the estimation of the model. For details see appendix D. Figure 2.3 shows the
correlation between states and this measure of prices.
2.4.4 Trade Parameters
There are 4 brands in the estimated economy. Of those brands, there were 2100 sales over
the sample period (see table 2.1), i.e. 150 sales per year over 14 years.
The total number of each brand sold relative to the total, also in table 2.1, yields the
probability of each car being offered at any given auction, namely ρ = (7/21, 5/21, 5/21, 4/21).
In the estimated model the sales rate (fraction of auctions that result in a sale) is
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about ten percent. I therefore assume that there are 1500 auctions per year.
In the model sellers are exogenously drawn for auctions. I assume that sellers get 6
chances per year to sell their car because there are 6 auction events in the data where
sellers could enter a car. This means that the probability for a seller of being picked for
an auction is 6/1500 = 0.004. Since all sellers have the same probability of being active,
the number of sellers is given by 1/0.004 = 250. I assume the total number of agents
is N = 1000, i.e. 3/4 of the market are buyers. Finally, I rescale these parameters by
dividing the market size by 10 to estimate a smaller market for computational reasons.
This yields Number of auctions: 150, ρ˜ = 0.04, Number of sellers: 25, N = 100.
There are now 150 periods per year (since each period consists of one auction). Assume
an annual discount rate of 0.99. This implies a per-period discount rate of 0.991/150 =
0.999933. Since the wealth process was calibrated to annual data, assume that wealth
changes every period with probability 1/150 and stays the same with probability 149/150.
More details in appendix D.1.
The probability of a buyer being active is σ = 0.02 since buyers will not be at most
auctions. The low value of σ captures the decentralized nature of the market: Auctions
in the data take place in only three locations in the US, which will be costly to get to for
many potential buyers.
There is also a 5% transaction cost for the seller. The two auction houses in the data
charge seller fees between 0% and 15%.7 In the United States gains from selling a classic
car are liable for capital gains tax, which is 15% or 20% (depending on the income of the
seller). The model does not track the seller’s gains so it is not possible to include the tax
treatment of cars. Instead, all transactions costs are summarized into one figure of 5%.
Buyers pay a fee to the auction house too but this fee is already included in the published
prices that are used in this paper.8
2.4.5 Demand Parameters
I will estimate the vector of w, the flow utilities of each car, using method of simulated
moments (McFadden, 1989). The estimator minimises the distance between the prices
predicted by the model and the empirical prices. The model-predicted price is the expected
second highest bid on each car, averaged over states. This yields four moments for four
unknown parameters. The flow utility wj associated with each brand is thus identified
simply from the expected price of the average car of that brand over the sample period.
















Notes: Bootstrapped Standard Errors in Parentheses.
model moments for each state for two example brands. The estimation method matches the
model-predicted prices for each brand averaged over states to the empirical counterpart,
represented by the horizontal lines in figure 2.4. Prices by states were thus not used
separately for the estimation. As the figure shows, the overall positive correlation between
the state and prices is replicated by the model but there is additional variation in the
empirical prices that the model does not match. Prices for cars in the data are very
variable, which shows up in the wide standard deviation around the empirical prices in 2.4
and is also reflected in the standard error of the expected prices predicted by the model.
Prices over the sample period as predicted by the model compared to the data are
shown in figure 2.5a. Again, empirical prices display more variance than the model pre-
dicts. In the model, expected prices change over time only due to changes in mean wealth
(the exogenous state variable). In the data prices will have differed over time due to
additional reasons, for example tastes changing over time.
Figure (2.6) plots the equilibrium bid functions bj(y, y¯) predicted by the model for the
estimated parameters. The possibility to resell implies that even relatively poor bidders
are willing to submit high bids so that at the lower end of the bid function, the slope is
very steep. The poorest bidders are willing to almost exhaust their budget constraint and
would, upon winning, sell the car again as soon as possible.
2.5.1 Price Volatility
Variation in the price for a given car within a state in the model comes from uncertainty
in the bidder pool. Since each buyer has probability σ of being active in any one auction,
both the number of active bidders and their wealth is random for each auction. The
simulation of the model draws different bidder pools, which yields an expected price for
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Figure 2.4: Model and Empirical Moments
(a) Ferrari (b) Jaguar
(c) Porsche (d) Mercedes-Benz
Notes: Expected price by brand and by state in black against empirical average price by brand and by state.
Average over states for each brand is matched exactly by estimation (black horizontal line). Bootstrapped
error bands in gray and light blue.
Figure 2.5: Expected Prices over Sample Period
(a) Model vs Data (b) Dynamic Effect
Notes: Prices averaged over all brands. Left: Dotted lines are mean +/- one standard deviation. Right:
Red line plots predicted average prices if bid function fixed at mean state over sample period but wealth
allowed to vary.
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Figure 2.6: Bid Functions
(a) Different brands (b) Different levels of y¯
Notes: Bid functions bj(y, y¯) predicted by the model for the estimated parameters plotted as a function of
private wealth y. Left: for each car j in the economy and mean income y¯ fixed at USD 4 Million. Right:
For Ferrari at two different values of the state variable mean wealth, y¯ = USD 3 Million and y¯ = USD 4
Million. Shaded areas: Mean +/- one standard deviation of wealth of the second richest active bidder
when y¯ = USD 4 Million. Given the bid functions turn out to be increasing for the estimated parameters,
the bid of the second richest bidder will determine the selling price.
each car and state and a variance around it.
Moreover, there is variation in the expected price for a car across states of the economy.
In higher states, buyers are richer on average. Since the bid function is increasing in wealth,
one would expect bids and average prices to increase. This is a shift along the bid function.
In addition, figure (2.6b) shows that the bid function shifts up for higher states. The bid
function shifts out because in higher states future prices are expected to be high, which
makes it more attractive to be a seller next period and less attractive to be a buyer next
period. Both effects increase bidders’ current willingness to pay at every level of wealth.
As the figure shows the two bid functions converge for higher levels of wealth because
bidders with high wealth expect that after purchase they are unlikely to sell, and hence
care less about future expected prices. The shift in the bid function from a lower to a
higher state amplifies volatility across states, as compared the direct wealth effect alone.
The red line in figure 2.5b plots the time series of prices that would results from
shutting down this ‘dynamic’ effect by keeping the bid function fixed at the average state
over the sample period and changing only the wealth of bidders. The standard deviation
of prices without the dynamic effect is 0.018, or 48% of the standard deviation of prices
predicted by the unrestricted model, which is 0.037. In other words, 52% of the standard
deviation of prices over time as predicted by the model comes from the dynamic effect of
agents changing their strategies according to the state of the economy and only 48% is
generated by the direct wealth effect of stock market swings.
The counterfactuals below will explore the role of resale in generating price variation
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both within and across states of the economy.
2.5.2 Discussion
Before moving onto the counterfactuals, I briefly discuss some limitations imposed by the
data and reflected in my estimation approach.
My data from classic cars has the advantage of covering a relatively long horizon and
being from a small enough market to warrant the assumption of being exogenous to the
state of the economy. These are both important for exploring price volatility over the
business cycle, as I do here. A downside to the data is that I only observe transaction
prices but not the number of bidders or bidder identities. This means I have to calibrate
the number of bidders N and the probabilities of being active for sellers ρ˜ and for bidders
σ.
Moreover, there are large amounts of unobserved heterogeneity between cars (unob-
served by the econometrician but observed by market participants). This shows up in a
high bootstrapped standard deviation of empirical and predicted prices in figure 2.4.
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity and the lack of data on the same bidder
bidding on different cars, makes it infeasible to flexibly estimate a substitution matrix
between cars as Backus and Lewis (2019) do in their setting. Cross price elasticities




The fact that classic cars are actively traded and can be resold in future auctions is an
important aspect of this market, as discussed above, and makes them asset-like rather than
pure consumption goods. This first counterfactual exercise will rule out resale. Buyers who
buy afterwards stay sellers forever. The seller value function then becomes the following:
Skeepj (y, y¯) = ln(ψy) + wj + E[S
keep
j (y
′, y¯′)|y, y¯] (2.8)
The rest of the model remains the same.
Bid Functions
Solving this version of the model with the parameters estimated above yields the bid
functions in figure (2.7a). Figure (2.7b) shows a comparison between one bid function in
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Figure 2.7: Bid Functions No Resale
(a) Different brands. (b) Comparison With Resale.
Notes: Bid functions bj(y, y¯) predicted by the model without resale for the estimated parameters plotted
as a function of private wealth y. Shaded areas: Mean +/- one standard deviation of wealth of the second
richest active bidder.
the original model with resale and the counterfactual one without resale. Since without
resale there is no option value of selling, the bid function is strictly below the one with
resale. Moreover the option to sell is worth more to bidders with less wealth, so that the
two bid functions converge towards the upper end of the wealth distribution.
This has two implications for prices. First, average prices will be lower without resale
because of the loss of the option value. Second, the variance around the expected price per
car and state will be higher without resale because the bid function is steeper, i.e. random
changes in the pool of active bidders will have a larger effect on the price. Intuitively, with
resale there will be ‘flipping’: If there happen to be relatively poor bidders, someone will
buy the car in the expectation to sell it again soon at a higher price. These flippers help
to smooth out fluctuations in the price due to randomness of the pool of active bidders.
Without resale this is not possible. Figure 2.8a accordingly shows that the density of
prices within one state is more narrow with resale than without. Moreover, the table in
appendix E shows that without resale the average price is lower and the standard deviation
is higher in each state than with resale.
Figure (2.7b) also shows the difference in bid functions between states. With resale
the difference is larger because, as explained above, in higher states the expected resale
value is higher, which bidders thus pay extra for in higher states. When this resale value
is not present, the difference in bids between states narrows. Note that the two curves
again converge at the top of the wealth distribution. The richest bidders expect to never
want to sell and therefore do not take the resale value into account much, even when it is
possible to resell. This smaller gap between bids in different states implies that average
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Figure 2.8: Prices with no and many resale opportunities
(a) Density within state. (b) Prices over sample period.
Notes: Left: Density of prices for Ferrari car in state y¯ = 3.8 Million. Right: Predicted Prices averaged
over all brands. Bootstrapped error band of one standard deviation in gray.
prices will fluctuate less across states than with resale.
There are thus two effects of resale on the volatility of prices: Within a state resale helps
to smooth out random fluctuations in the price but at the same time resale tends to amplify
fluctuations in the average price across states. Appendix A.3 shows an analytical solution
to a two-period model with aggregate shocks with and without resale. The analytical
model confirms that with resale prices will differ more between states than without resale.
Prices over the Sample Period
Figure (2.8b) shows that indeed the predicted price averaged across brands over the sample
period is lower in every year in the case without resale than with resale. The difference
is about one (bootstrapped) standard deviation of the predicted average prices by state.
Across the sample period, prices would have been 8% lower on average without resale than
with resale. As the figure also shows, the volatility of prices over the sample period would
have been very similar without resale. For the estimated parameters, resale does not seem
to amplify price volatility.
More Resale Opportunities for Sellers
This conclusion changes if sellers have more frequent opportunities to resell their car.
Suppose that, in the extreme, sellers could resell their car every period, i.e. ρ˜ = 1. This
would mean holding as many auctions as there are sellers every period. Alternatively,
sellers might have other outside markets where they can try to sell their car, e.g. through
private sellers. Figure 2.8a shows that with many resale opportunities the density moves
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to the right and becomes more narrow than in the baseline case, i.e. the exact opposite
to the change without resale. A price due to a bad draw of active bidders is now very
unlikely to be realised because speculators can buy the car and immediately (in the next
period) try to resell at a higher price.
In this counterfactual with ρ˜ = 1, prices would therefore have been 31% higher over
the sample period. The difference in volatility is also substantial: The standard deviation
normalised by the mean over the sample period increases from 0.09 to 0.11 , an increase
of 21%. Very frequent resale opportunities thus increase the option value of resale and
increase the fluctuations therein across states, which leads to more volatile prices.
Demand parameter estimates without resale
Given that predicted prices without resale are lower with the estimated parameters, one
may expect that estimating the model while ignoring the possibility to resell a car will
bias parameter estimates of w, the flow utilities of each car, upwards. Indeed, estimating
the model without resale yields larger estimates for every element of w as shown in E. The
difference is relatively small however, at about one standard error of the original parameter
estimate.
2.6.2 Centralized Trade
Auctions for classic cars take place in various locations and at various times over the year.
Therefore, at any given auction only a small fraction of potential buyers will be present.
The estimation captures this with a low probability of being active for buyers of σ =
0.02. This section considers a counterfactual experiment where trade is centralized, which
is modelled as letting all buyers be active at every auction, i.e. σ = 1. Bodoh-Creed
et al. (2019) consider the effects of centralizing auctions on eBay by combining several
auctions on the same day into fewer multi-unit auctions. Due to having a model with an
endogenous supply side, I can here additionally consider the seller response to centralizing
trade. The aggregate shocks in the model allow me to also look at the effect on price
volatility, in addition to the effect on the average price.
A higher value of σ implies that more bidders will be present at each auction and hence
the wealth of the richest bidders will be higher in expectation. This will tend to increase
selling prices. On the other hand, a higher probability of being active again next period
increases the option value of waiting by losing the auction. Hence bidders will shade their
bids more, which will tend to decrease prices. Which effect dominates will determine the
net effect on prices of centralizing trade. A larger bidder pool at each auction also means
that the variation in the wealth of bidders from one auction to the next goes down.
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It turns out that the overall effect of centralizing trade on prices is negative, i.e. the
shading effect dominates the wealth effect on the active bidder pool. Prices by brand
predicted by the baseline version of the model and in the centralized version are shown
in appendix E. The average price across models falls very substantially: the difference is
34%, which is statistically significant as the table shows.
Centralizing trade also has an effect on the behaviour of sellers: With more active
bidders at each auction, sellers are more likely to sell whenever they are given the chance
to do so. In the baseline model 15% of auctions end with a sale. With a centralized buyer
side the number of selling opportunities stays the same for sellers but the sales rate is
now 35%. This is because with the same active bidders in every auction there is a lower
incentive for sellers to wait and try to sell again to a richer bidder pool. A higher sales rate
implies that cars are more often owned by the richest agents, i.e. the allocation improves.
More Resale Opportunities under Centralized Trading
Finally, consider what happens when sellers again get to sell every period (ρ˜ = 1) but
under the current scenario of centralized trade (σ = 1). Now the average price increases
compared to centralized trade with the baseline frequency of selling opportunities, as one
would expect, but is still below the baseline price level (decentralized trade and infrequent
selling opportunities). Compared to the baseline, the average price is 19% lower.
More interestingly, price volatility over the sample period remains the same: The
standard deviation divided by the mean price over the sample period is approximately the
same as in the baseline model. This is in stark contrast to the counterfactual with frequent
selling opportunities under decentralized trade, where price volatility across states of the
economy was substantially above the baseline case. The explanation for this difference is
that under centralized trade, the bidder pool does not change from one period to the next,
eliminating the scope for buying cars at a low price to resell them at a higher one because
the same bidders that are active in the current auction will be active in the next one.9
2.7 Conclusion
This paper has argued that taking into account resale opportunities is important whenever
they are present, especially when market participants are subject to shocks, for example
to their wealth. I have shown that resale increases average selling prices due to the option
value of resale. When sellers have frequent opportunities to resell, the option value of
9 Bidders’ wealth will still change from one auction to the next due to the additive wealth shock i,t
but this effect is small compared to the changing composition of the active bidder pool in the decetralized
case.
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resale may also increase price volatility across states of the economy because the option
value is higher in better states.
Centralizing trade in markets with resale not only benefits buyers by allowing them
to substitute more easily to their most preferred good but also allows owners to sell at
less variable prices and therefore leads to more frequent transactions. Centralized trade
also reduces the scope for speculation and therefore more frequent resale opportunities do
not lead to more volatile prices when trade is centralized. It can thus help guard against
price volatility that the possibility to speculate introduces in markets where resale is very
common.
While the model was estimated using data from auctions for classic cars, which has
the advantage of having a known trading mechanism and being plausibly too small to
affect the aggregate economy, these insights carry over to important markets, such as the





Abstract: This chapter compares two models of sequential auctions. The first model has
all bidders enter in the first period, as in the canonical model in Weber (1983). The second
model has bidders enter one by one. This makes the game stationary from the perspective
of a bidder who anticipates bidding again next period, as in several structural models in
the empirical literature on sequential auctions (for example Backus and Lewis, 2019). In
the first model bidders bid as if they are going to win the next auction with certainty,
even if their value is low, because only then are deviations in the present auction payoff
relevant. In the second auction bidders account for the probability of winning next period
conditional on their value, which implies that higher bidders shade more. Nevertheless,
the two models turn out to be revenue equivalent. Moreover, in both models prices are in
expectation the same in every period.
3.1 Introduction
While many markets can be modelled as a sequences of auctions, not all of these markets
function identically, in particular with respect to how bidders arrive to these markets.
Christie’s and Sotheby’s organise auctions for art that take place in a sequence over one or
several days. The online marketplace eBay at any point in time has many auctions taking
place one after the other. An important difference between these two examples is that
at the beginning of a wine or art auction all potential buyers are typically present and
can bid in all of the individual auctions taking place. On eBay bidders arrive at different
times and so bidders do not get the opportunity to bid on auctions that took place before
their arrival. Bidder entry also changes the expected outside option of bidding in the next
auction whenever a bidder loses the current auction. This paper therefore investigates in a
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stylized setting how the timing of bidders’ arrival to the game affects the optimal bidding
strategies and auction outcomes including expected prices and efficiency of the allocation.
In the canonical model of sequential auctions, presented in Weber (1983), the game
consists of a finite sequence of auctions for one of a pre-specified number of identical
objects each. Bidders have unit demand and are all present in the first auction. After
each auction the winner exits and the losing bidders continue into the next round. I will
contrast this with an alternative model in which only two randomly selected bidders enter
the first auction and one new player enters every subsequent auction. The rest of the games
will be identical. Winning bidders again exit after each round and losing bidders continue
into the next round. The important difference between the two models is that only in
the Weber model can continuing bidders learn new information about their competitors’
valuations from the first auction to the next. In the second model continuing bidders face
a new entrant as competitor whom they have not learned anything about. This makes the
second game stationary from the point of view of the continuing bidder, while the Weber
model is not stationary.
How, if at at all, is the difference between these models reflected in equilibrium strate-
gies, player payoffs, and seller revenue? I show in this chapter that the equilibrium bid
functions differ in an interesting way: In the stationary model bidders shade their bid by
the value of continuing into the next auction, which depends on their expected probability
of winning that auction. In the Weber model, bidders shade their bid by the value of
continuing into the next period assuming they are going to win with certainty, even if
their value of the object is low. Bidders changing their bid marginally only affect their
payoff in the auction if they are tied with the highest competing bidder. Since bidders in
the Weber model will face the same competitors again next period, this implies winning
next period and so bidders condition their bid on this scenario. In the stationary model on
the other hand, being tied with their competitor this period says nothing about bidders’
probability of winning next period because they will then face a new competitor.
I also show that the two models are payoff and revenue equivalent. The expected price
in both models is the same and is moreover the same in all periods of each game.
A growing empirical literature on sequential auctions commonly models sequential
auctions as stationary. Relating this class of stationary models to the canonical model in
Weber (1983) is therefore interesting from this perspective, too.
The remainder of the introduction reviews the literature related to this chapter with
a focus on information release across auctions. The rest of the chapter is organised as fol-
lows: Section 3.2 explains the set-up of the two models. Section 3.3 derives the equilibria
of the two games with two periods and explores the difference between them. Section 3.4
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extends the game to more than two periods and establishes that the two games result in
the same allocation and that in both games expected prices are the same in every period.
Section 3.7 concludes.
Related Literature. The famous result in Weber (1983) is that in his model of se-
quential auctions prices are the same in expectation in each period, although the average
valuation among bidders left in the game is falling. The paper shows that it does not affect
the outcome of the game whether the selling price is announced after each auction or not.
Said (2012) demostrates that in this setting, bidder entry may lead to the non-existence
of a symmetric equilibrium with sealed bid auctions.
Another strand of literature, starting with Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994), assumes that
values are drawn not before the beginning of the game for the duration of the game but
are drawn each period independently from other periods’ values of the same bidder. Since
values are not correlated across periods, there is no scope for learning as the game pro-
gresses. This leads to a stationary equilibrium but implies that bidders have no persistent
private information about their values, which is not suitable for many applications.
Starting with Backus and Lewis (2019), a structural literature on sequential auction
markets including Hendricks and Sorensen (2018) and Coey et al. (2019), assumes a mean-
field equilibrium in which bidders do not take the full strategic environment into account
but optimise their bid against a stationary distribution of rival bids. This approach main-
tains persistent differences between bidders but assumes that bidders do not take the
information generated by one auction about the next into account.
Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) and Bodoh-Creed et al. (2019) assume a continuum
of players, which also leads to stationary strategies because the actions of any one player
do not affect the aggregate outcome.
3.2 Model
There are M periods and N = M +1 bidders. In each period one of M identical objects is
sold through a second price sealed-bid auction without reserve price. Each bidder’s value
is an independent random variable X with distribution F (x) that takes values between 0
and x¯. Bidders privately observe the realisation x of their value before the start of the
game. Bidders have unit demand. There is no discounting between the two periods.
This section presents two models that have this set-up in common. In the first model
all N bidders enter the first auction. After the first and all subsequent auctions, the winner
exits while all losing bidders continue into the next auction. The second model has only
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two bidders enter the first auction and has one new bidder enter each subsequent auction
to bid against the continuing bidder from the previous round. From the perspective of the
continuing bidder the second model is stationary in that the continuing bidder expects to
face a competitor in the next round with the same distribution of values as in the present
one. I will refer to this model therefore as the stationary model.1
3.2.1 Weber Model
In the first period all M + 1 bidders submit a bid on the first object. The winner of the
first auction exits. The M remaining bidders move into the second period and bid again
on an identical object. The winner of the second auction exits and the remaining bidders
continue into the third auction, and so on. A bidder’s value x for the object remains the
same for all periods of the game. After each auction it will be revealed who won but
the selling price will be kept hidden from the losing bidders. Weber (1983) shows that
announcing the selling price after each auction does not change the outcome of the game.
3.2.2 Stationary Model
In the first period two out of the M + 1 bidders are chosen at random to submit a bid
on the first object. The winner exits while the remaining bidder moves into the second
period. One of the M − 1 bidders who did not participate in the first auction is chosen at
random and enters the second auction. After the second auction the winner exits and the
loser continues into the third auction. A new randomly picked bidder will enter the third
auction, and so on. In each auction there are thus two bidders. After each auction it will
be revealed who won but not what the selling price was.
3.3 Equilibrium for Two Periods
This section restricts both games to M = 2 and derives the equilibria for both games und
this assumption. Section 3.4 will consider the case M ≥ 3.
A player’s strategy in both of these games with two periods consists of two bid func-
tions, which, for each period, map the range of possible values [0, x¯] to a nonnegative bid.
Both games end after the second period and so the second auction amounts to a static
second price auction, in which players have a dominant strategy to bid their value. In
both games the second-period bid function of any symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
1 The model is not fully stationary because after the first round the valuation of the continuing bidder
does not follow the same distribution as that of the new entrant. But the important aspect is that it is
stationary from the perspective of the continuing bidder.
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will therefore be b2(x) = x. We are then interested in the symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium bids at t = 1 in each of the two models.
3.3.1 Equilibrium in the Weber Model
There are N = 3 players in this version of the game with M = 2 and so each bidder faces
two competitors in the first round of the Weber game. Throughout, I will be using the
notation X(i:n) for the ith highest order statistic from n draws. X(1:2) is thus the larger
of the two competing values and X(2:2) is the lower one. They have a joint distribution
fX(1:2)X(2:2)(·, ·). Conjecture that the other bidders are playing according to an increasing
bid function bW (·). A bidder with valuation x who submits bid B will then win the first
auction if B > bW (X(1:2)). The bidder will lose the first and then win the second auction
if B < bW (X(1:2)) and if, given that in the second round all bidders will bid their own
value, x > X(2:2). If B < bW (X(1:2)) and x < X(2:2) the bidder will lose both auctions and







1B>bW (x(1:2))(x− bW (x(1:2))) + 1B<bW (x(1:2))1x>x(2:2)(x− x(2:2))
)
fX(1:2)X(2:2)(x(1:2), x(2:2))dx(2:2)dx(1:2) (3.1)
Solving the problem in (3.1) yields the equilibrium in the Weber model.
Proposition 1. The Weber Model with M = 2 periods has a unique symmetric subgame
perfect equilibrium in which all players in period 1 bid according to the bid function bW (x),
which satisfies:
bW (x) = E[X|X < x] (3.2)
Proof. See Appendix.
To build intuition for this result it helps to compare it to the static second price auction,
where the optimal bid is equal to x. There bidding less than x exposes the bidder to the
risk of losing the auction when the object could have been bought for an amount below
x (when the highest competing bid is also below x). In that case the bidder would have
preferred to buy. Similarly in this model, bidding any less than E[X|X < x] means to
possibly forgo buying in the first period below the price at which the bidder can expect
to buy in period two.
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3.3.2 Equilibrium in the Stationary Model
This section derives the unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of the stationary
Model. In the stationary model each bidder faces one competitor in the first auction.
Conjecture that this competitor in the first auction is playing a monotone bid function
bS(·). Let X1 be the value of the competitor that a bidder faces in the first period and
let X2 be the value of the competitor that the bidder will face in the second round. A
bidder with value x who submits bid B in the first period then wins the first auction if
B > bS(X1). The bidder will lose the first and then win the second auction if B < bS(X1)
and if, given that in the second round all bidders will bid their own value, x > X2. If
B < bS(X1) and x < X2 the bidder will lose both auctions and have a payoff of zero.
The key difference to the Weber model is that X1 and X2 are two independent random
variables with the same distribution as X. Their joint pdf is fX1X2(x1, x2) = f(x1) ·f(x2).
The order statistics X(1:2) and X(2:2), which are relevant to the Weber model above, are
not distributed independently. The objective in the stationary model can be written in








1B>bS(x1)(x− bS(x1)) + 1B<bS(x1)1x>x2(x− x2)
)
fX1X2(x1, x2)dx1dx2 (3.3)











See appendix for details. Solving (3.4) yields the equilibrium in the stationary Model.
Proposition 2. The stationary Model has a unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
in which all players at t = 1 bid according to the bid function bS(x), which satisfies:
bS(x) = x− F (x)(x−E[X|X < x]) (3.5)
Proof. See Appendix.
This equilibrium bid function can be interpreted as the value of the object less the value of
continuing into the next period. The value of moving into the next period is the probability
of winning the next auction, Pr[x > X] = F (x), times the expected payoff of winning the
auction, (x−E[X|X < x]).
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Figure 3.1: Bid Functions with Uniformly Distributed Values
Notes: Equilibrium bid functions bW (x) and bS(x) as per equations (3.2) and (3.5) for the case of
X ∼ U [0, 1]. bW (x) = 12x and bS(x) = x− 12x2, see Appendix F.5.
3.3.3 Comparison
This section looks at how the equilibrium bid functions of the two models differ and why.
Rewrite the bid function in the Weber model (3.2) as follows:
bW (x) = x− (x−E[X|X < x]) (3.6)
Written this way, both equilibrium strategies in the Weber model in (3.6) and in the
stationary model in (3.5) can be interpreted as the bidder’s valuation x shaded by an
opportunity cost of moving into the second auction. In the Weber model the amount of
shading equals (x− E[X|X < x]), the expected payoff of winning the second auction. In
the stationary model the amount of shading equals F (x)(x− E[X|X < x]), the expected
payoff of winning the second auction discounted by F (x), the probability of winning the
next auction.
In both models, deviating to a lower first-period bid affects payoffs only if the deviating
bidder has the highest valuation among the first-period bidders. In the Weber model the
highest first-period bidder will also be the highest bidder in the second auction, should
that bidder deviate and continue into that auction, because all players submit bids in the
first round. In the stationary model this is not the case. The continuing bidder in the
stationary model will face a new entrant who may have a higher valuation than even the
highest first-period bidder because that new entrant had not been active in the first round.
This explains why the equilibrium strategy in the Weber model conditions on winning the
second period auction while in the stationary model the equilibrium strategy accounts for
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Figure 3.2: Bid Functions in Different Periods with Uniformly Distributed Values
Notes: Equilibrium bid functions bW (x) and bS(x) as per equations (3.7) and (3.8) for the case of
X ∼ U [0, 1]. See appendix F.4.
the probability of winning the next auction: In the Weber model deviating in the first
round affects payoffs only for bidder types that will win the second auction but in the
stationary model a bidder who would have won the first auction may deviate to a low bid,
continue, and then lose the second auction.
Since F (x) ≤ 1, bidders in the Weber model shade more than in the stationary model.
One way to think about this is that since bidders in the Weber model bid as if they are
going to win the next auction with certainty, they assign a higher value to the outside
option of moving into the second auction. One can also notice that the expected valuation
of the competitor that the continuing bidder will face in the stationary model is higher
than in the Weber model, and therefore the continuation value in the Weber model is
indeed higher and so bidders should shade more.
In the stationary model bidders with higher values shade more since they have a higher
probability of winning in period two. Backus and Lewis (2016) discuss this effect and
explain that it leads to a concave bid function in their model (p.11). This effect depends
on stationarity and is absent in the Weber model, where all bidders condition their bid on
winning the second period. The two bid functions therefore converge as x becomes larger.
(Since F (x)→ 1 as x→ x¯.)
3.4 Equilibrium for M ≥ 3 Periods
This section extends the analysis to M objects and N = M + 1 bidders. The assumption
of N = M + 1 is necessary for the stationary model to retain a symmetric equilibrium, as
will become clear below.
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Proposition 3. The Weber model with M objects has a unique symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium in which all players bid according to the following bid function in period t =
1, ...,M :
bt(x) = E[X(M :M)|X(t:M) = x] (3.7)
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that forM = 2, this reduces to the equilibrium in proposition 1, since E[X(2:2)|X(1:2) =
x] = E[X|X < x] (see equation F.14 in the appendix).
Proposition 4. In the stationary model, let Vt(x) be the continuation value in period
t = 1, ...,M , i.e. the value of not winning at t and instead continuing into the auction
t+ 1. The stationary game has a unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which
all players bid according to the following bid function:
bt(x) = x− Vt(x) (3.8)
and the continuation value is as follows:
Vt(x) = F (x)(x−E[bt+1(x)|X < x]) + (1− F (x))Vt+1(x) (3.9)
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that VM−1(x) = F (x)(x − E[X|X < x]) and so for M = 2 this reduces to the
equilibrium in proposition 2.
In the stationary model, the newly entering bidder and the bidder continuing from the
previous period always have asymmetric beliefs about each others’ values. The entering
bidder’s value has distribution F (x) but in any increasing equilibrium the continuing bid-
der’s valuation has distribution FX(t:t)(x) in period t. Despite this asymmetry of beliefs
however, a symmetric equilibrium exits. Due to the second price format of the auction,
beliefs about competitor values in the current auction do not affect the optimal bid. Beliefs
about competitor values in subsequent auctions are important because they determine the
continuation value Vt(x). Conditional on continuing, however, both bidders have the same
beliefs about next period’s competition because next period’s competition always consists
of a new entrant. The game thus remains stationary in this respect. This would break
down with more than two bidders in any one period, which would mean there being more
than one continuing bidder each period and next period’s competition consisting of a new
entrant as well as other continuing bidders from the present auction. In that case the asym-
metry of beliefs would yield asymmetric bidding functions and no efficient equilibrium, as
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pointed out in Said (2012). Therefore, in addition to not accounting for the possibility to
bid against the same competitor again in future auctions, both the meanfield equilibrium
assumption and the assumption of a continuum of players avoid the asymmetry in optimal
strategies between continuing and newly entering bidders. The former by assuming that
continuing and entering bidders optimise against the same stationary distribution of rival
bids. The latter because with a continuum of bidders, the asymmetry in beliefs, caused
by one bidder being either a continuing bidder or an entrant, vanishes.
3.5 Payoffs and Prices
We have seen that both games have a unique symmetric equilibrium in increasing bid
functions. In the Weber model the highest-value bidder then wins the first auction, the
second-highest value bidder wins the second auction, and so on. The M highest-value
bidders all win an item in equilibrium. In the stationary model the higher of the two
active bidders will win in each auction. The losing bidder continues and bids again. All of
the M highest-value bidders will eventually win an auction. The bidder with the lowest
(i.e. the (M + 1)th value) will lose every auction after entering the game and is the
only bidder who does not receive an item in equilibrium. Both games therefore efficiently
allocate the M objects to the M highest-value bidders. Since both games have the same
allocation in equilibrium, it follows from the envelope theorem of Milgrom and Segal (2002)
that expected payments must be the same also.
Another mechanism that allocates M items efficiently to N bidders with unit demand
is the uniform price auction, in which the M highest bidders receive the object and all pay
the (M+1)th highest bid.2 Again, since the allocation is the same, equilibrium prices must
be the same in the Weber and in the stationary games as in the uniform price auction.
The symmetric equilibrium in the uniform price auction is to bid truthfully (Krishna,
2009). The expected price thus equals E[X(M+1:N)]. These results are summarised in the
following proposition:
Proposition 5. In both the Weber and the stationary model for M objects and N = M+1
bidders the M highest-value bidders receive the M items in equilibrium. They all pay the
same expected price, namely the expected valuation of the (M + 1)th highest bidder:
E[Pt] = E[X(M+1:M+1)] ∀t = 1, ...,M
The two games are thus payoff equivalent, and moreover prices in both games are in ex-
2 The uniform price auction is inefficient in general but efficient if bidders have unit demand (Krishna,
2009: p.196).
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pectation the same in every period.
Note that since players enter the game one by one in the stationary model, the winner
of auction t is going to have a value distributed according to the tth order statistic from
(t + 1) draws, i.e. X(t:t+1). The price at time t is determined by the second highest
bid, i.e. by valuation X(t+1:t+1). In the Weber model the winner has valuation X(t:M+1)
and the price is determined by the bidder with valuation X(t+1:M+1). The price is thus
determined by a bidder with a higher value in expectation in the Weber model than in the
stationary model (since the distribution of X(t+1:M+1) first-order dominates X(t+1:t+1)).
On the other hand, bid functions in the stationary model are above the bid functions
in the Weber model. These two effects turn out to exactly cancel each other, so that
expected prices are the same. For illustration, a direct derivation of expected prices for
the two-period case is in Appendix F.3.
3.6 Discounting
So far players were assumed to not discount the future (as in Weber, 1983). When players
discount the future with factor β, the equilibrium bid functions change in an intuitive way,
as follows:
Proposition 6. The Weber model with discounting has a unique symmetric subgame
perfect equilibrium in which all players bid according to the following bid function:
bt(x) = x− β(x−E[X(M :M)|X(t:M) = x]) (3.10)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 7. The stationary game with discounting has a unique symmetric subgame
perfect equilibrium in which all players bid according to the following bid function:
bt(x) = x− βVt(x) (3.11)
Proof. See Appendix.
With discounting the two games are not payoff equivalent. In the Weber game bidders with
relatively low values will always have to wait to receive the object because the highest-
value bidders will receive the object first. In the stationary model lower-value players
may receive the object early if the higher-value bidders happen to enter later on. With
discounting this difference in timing matters and so expected payoffs are not the same in
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the two games. The envelope theorem does not apply anymore here. In the two period
game with uniformly distributed values between 0 and 1 for example, the expected price
in the first period of the Weber game is 12 − β4 while in the stationary game it is 13 − β12 .
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has compared two stylized models of sequential auctions. The difference
between the models was such that one was stationary from the perspective of the bidders in
the first period and the other wasn’t. The stationary model is comparable to several models
in the recent literature that assume that bidders play against a stationary distribution of
rival bids rather than updating their beliefs from one auction to the next.
The analysis showed that the way bidders shade their bids below their value differs
between the two games and that the amount of shading increases in values only in the
stationary case. It also showed that the differences in the equilibrium strategies exactly
offset the differences in the way bidders arrive at the auctions to make the two games




Victor Aguirregabiria and Pedro Mira. Sequential estimation of dynamic discrete games.
Econometrica, 75(1):1–53, 2007.
Peter Arcidiacono and Robert A Miller. Conditional choice probability estimation of
dynamic discrete choice models with unobserved heterogeneity. Econometrica, 79(6):
1823–1867, 2011.
Alina Arefeva. How auctions amplify house-price fluctuations. Johns Hopkins Carey
Business School Research Paper, 2017.
Orley Ashenfelter. How auctions work for wine and art. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
3(3):23–36, 1989.
Orley Ashenfelter and David Genesove. Testing for price anomalies in real-estate auctions.
The American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 82(2):501–505, 1992.
Orley Ashenfelter and Kathryn Graddy. Sale rates and price movements in art auctions.
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 101(3):212–16, 2011.
Susan Athey and Philip A Haile. Identification of standard auction models. Econometrica,
70(6):2107–2140, 2002.
Matthew Backus and Gregory Lewis. Dynamic demand estimation in auction markets.
NBER Working Paper, No. 22375, 2016.
Matthew Backus and Gregory Lewis. Dynamic demand estimation in auction markets.
Working Paper, 2019.
Patrick Bayer, Robert McMillan, Alvin Murphy, and Christopher Timmins. A dynamic
model of demand for houses and neighborhoods. Econometrica, 84(3):893–942, 2016.
Alan Beggs and Kathryn Graddy. Declining values and the afternoon effect: Evidence
from art auctions. The RAND Journal of Economics, 28(3):544–565, 1997.
65
Jess Benhabib and Alberto Bisin. Skewed wealth distributions: Theory and empirics.
Journal of Economic Literature, 56(4):1261–1291, 2018.
Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, and Shenghao Zhu. The wealth distribution in bewley
models with capital income risk. Journal of Economic Theory, 159:459–515, 2015.
Aaron Bodoh-Creed, Joern Boehnke, and Brent Richard Hickman. How efficient are
decentralized auction platforms? Review of Economic Studies, Forthcoming, 2019.
Eric Budish. Sequencing and information revelation in auctions for imperfect substitutes:
Understanding ebay’s market design. Manuscript, Harvard University, 2008.
Benjamin J Burton and Joyce P Jacobsen. Measuring returns on investments in col-
lectibles. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13(4):193–212, 1999.
Kalyan Chatterjee and William Samuelson. Bargaining under incomplete information.
Operations research, 31(5):835–851, 1983.
Dominic Coey, Bradley J Larsen, and Brennan C Platt. Discounts and deadlines in con-
sumer search. NBER Working Paper 22038, 2019.
Dale Dannefer. Rationality and passion in private experience: Modern consciousness and
the social world of old-car collectors. Social Problems, 27(4):392–412, 1980.
Elroy Dimson, Peter L Rousseau, and Christophe Spaenjers. The price of wine. Journal
of Financial Economics, 118(2):431–449, 2015.
Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans. Sequential auctions of stochastically equivalent objects.
Economics Letters, 44(1-2):87–90, 1994.
Rod Garratt and Thomas Tro¨ger. Speculation in standard auctions with resale. Econo-
metrica, 74(3):753–769, 2006.
Alessandro Gavazza. An empirical equilibrium model of a decentralized asset market.
Econometrica, 84(5):1755–1798, 2016.
William N Goetzmann. Accounting for taste: Art and the financial markets over three
centuries. The American Economic Review, 83(5):1370–1376, 1993.
William N Goetzmann, Luc Renneboog, and Christophe Spaenjers. Art and money. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 101(3):222–226, 2011.
Thomas A Gresik and Mark A Satterthwaite. The rate at which a simple market converges
to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading
mechanisms. Journal of Economic theory, 48(1):304–332, 1989.
66
Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong. Optimal nonparametric estima-
tion of first-price auctions. Econometrica, 68(3):525–574, 2000.
Isa Hafalir and Vijay Krishna. Asymmetric auctions with resale. American Economic
Review, 98(1):87–112, 2008.
Philip A Haile. Auctions with resale markets: an application to us forest service timber
sales. American Economic Review, 91(3):399–427, 2001.
Kenneth Hendricks and Alan Sorensen. Dynamics and efficiency in decentralized online
auction markets. NBER Working Paper 25002, 2018.
Mireia Jofre-Bonet and Martin Pesendorfer. Estimation of a dynamic auction game.
Econometrica, 71(5):1443–1489, 2003.
Vijay Krishna. Auction theory. Academic press, 2009.
Gregory Lewis. Asymmetric information, adverse selection and online disclosure: The case
of ebay motors. American Economic Review, 101(4):1535–46, 2011.
Stefano Lovo and Christophe Spaenjers. A model of trading in the art market. American
Economic Review, 108(3):744–74, 2018.
R Preston McAfee and Daniel Vincent. The declining price anomaly. Journal of Economic
Theory, 60(1):191–212, 1993.
Daniel McFadden. A method of simulated moments for estimation of discrete response
models without numerical integration. Econometrica, 57(5):995–1026, 1989.
Jianping Mei and Michael Moses. Art as an investment and the underperformance of
masterpieces. American Economic Review, 92(5):1656–1668, 2002.
Paul Milgrom and Ilya Segal. Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets. Econometrica,
70(2):583–601, 2002.
Paul R Milgrom and Robert J Weber. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding.
Econometrica, 50(5):1089–1122, 1982.
Roger B Myerson and Mark A Satterthwaite. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading.
Journal of economic theory, 29(2):265–281, 1983.
Adolfo Orsi and Raffaele Gazzi. Classic Car Auction Yearbook 2016-2017. Historica
Selecta, 2017.
67
James E Pesando. Art as an investment: The market for modern prints. The American
Economic Review, 83(5):1075–1089, 1993.
Martin Pesendorfer and Philipp Schmidt-Dengler. Asymptotic least squares estimators for
dynamic games. The Review of Economic Studies, 75(3):901–928, 2008.
John G Riley and William F Samuelson. Optimal auctions. The American Economic
Review, 71(3):381–392, 1981.
James W Roberts. Unobserved heterogeneity and reserve prices in auctions. The RAND
Journal of Economics, 44(4):712–732, 2013.
Maher Said. Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers. Games and Economic
Behavior, 73(1):236–243, 2011.
Maher Said. Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization.
Journal of Economic Theory, 147(6):2419–2438, 2012.
Mark Satterthwaite and Artyom Shneyerov. Dynamic matching, two-sided incomplete
information, and participation costs: Existence and convergence to perfect competition.
Econometrica, 75(1):155–200, 2007.
Mark Satterthwaite and Artyom Shneyerov. Convergence to perfect competition of a
dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and
exogenous exit rate. Games and Economic Behavior, 63(2):435–467, 2008.
Mark A Satterthwaite and Steven R Williams. The rate of convergence to efficiency in
the buyer’s bid double auction as the market becomes large. The Review of Economic
Studies, 56(4):477–498, 1989.
Pasquale Schiraldi. Automobile replacement: a dynamic structural approach. The RAND
Journal of Economics, 42(2):266–291, 2011.
Gerard J Van den Berg, Jan C Van Ours, and Menno P Pradhan. The declining price
anomaly in dutch dutch rose auctions. American Economic Review, 91(4):1055–1062,
2001.
Robert J Weber. Multiple-object auctions. In R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, M. Shubik, and
R. M. Stark, editors, Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting, pages 165–191. New York
University Press, New York, 1983.




A Illustrative Models of Sequential Auctions
This section presents a number of two period models of sequential auctions that can be
solved analytically to shed more light on the mechanisms operating in the main model,
which only has a numerical solution.
A.1 Continuation Values and Resale
There are two bidders and one seller active in each period of the game. The game consists
of two periods t. Valuations are a random variable X which is distributed uniformly
between 0 and 1: X ∼ U [0, 1]. Players observe the realisation of their value x before the
start of the game. Valuations stay the same throughout the game in this version of the
game. Players do not discount the future. Each period consists of a second-price auction
with reserve price r. The reserve price is set by a seller with valuation XS . Assume at
first that each auction is efficient, i.e. r(XS) = XS . This will be the optimal secret reserve
price if the seller has to accept or reject the selling price after all bids have been received.
Section A.2 will look at the same game but with an optimal public reserve price.
Players in the game have stationary beliefs about other players’ valuations, i.e. a
continuing bidder will believe his competitor’s value will again be drawn from U [0, 1].
Assume also a stationary distribution for XS , namely that it is distributed according
to the first order statistic among three draws, i.e. X(1:3), which will result if among two
bidders and one seller, the object is in expectation owned by the agent with the highest
valuation. Values X have cdf F (x) = x and so FXS (x) = x
3.
We are interested in bidding strategies t = 1 under different assumptions about what
bidders perceive to happen at t = 2.
Bidder Continuation Value
Upon losing the first auction, a bidder will continue into the second period to bid again.
The game ends after the second period, so the equilibria in the second auction will be that
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of a static second price auction. We will focus on the unique symmetric equilibrium in
which all players bid their own value. In the second period the bidder with value x will
then win if x > max(XS , X¯) where X¯ is the competitor’s value with cdf F (x¯) = x¯. With
an efficient aucion in the second period, Pr[x > max(XS , X
′)] = Pr[x > X ′ ∩ x > XS ] =
F (x)FXS (x) = x
4. The continuation of losing is then:
V (x) = Pr[x > max(XS , X¯)](x−E[max(XS , X¯)|max(XS , X¯) < x])

























Suppose bidders anticipate being able to sell their object in an efficient second price auction
in the second period. In an efficient auction the reserve price will be equal to the seller’s
value, which is the revenue-maximising reserve price if the seller’s action is to accept or
reject the selling price after all bids have been received, as in the main model. There are
two bidders. If X(1:2) < x there will be no sale, if X(2:2) < x < X(1:2) there will be a sale
at price x and if x < X(2:2) there will a sale at price X(2:2). Only in the last case will the
seller gain from the sale. The continuation value upon buying in the first period is then
as follows:














We will now look at four different models, partly motivated by the existing literature, and
compare the resulting bid functions in period one.
1. Static: Bidders perceive the first period to be a one-shot game.
b(x) = x.
2. Dynamic buyers, no resale: Bidders take the continuation value of losing into account
but there is no resale, i.e. no continuation value upon buying. This corresponds to
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Figure A.3: Bid Functions
(a) Static Buyer Side. (b) Dynamic Buyer Side.
several models in the literature, including Backus and Lewis (2019), Hendricks and
Sorensen (2018), and Bodoh-Creed et al. (2019).
b(x) = x− V (x) = x− 15x5.
3. Static buyers, with resale: Bidders ignore the continuation value of losing, e.g. be-
cause all losing bidders are assumed to exit but there is resale and hence a contin-
uation value of winning the first auction. This corresponds to the assumptions in
Lovo and Spaenjers (2018).
b(x) = x+ S(x) = 13 + x
2 − 13x3.
4. Both: Dynamic buyers, with resale. Bidders bid taking the continuation value of
losing and winning into account.
b(x) = x+ S(x)− V (x) = 13 + x2 − 13x3 − 15x5.
Figure A.3 plots the resulting bid function for each of the four cases. We can note the
following about the bid functions:
- Resale affects the bottom of the bid function: bid functions with and without resale
have different intercepts but converge at the top. Intuitively, in the absence of shocks,
this is the result of the possibility to ‘flip’ and object, i.e. to sell it to a bidder with a
higher valuation next period.
- Buyer continuation value affects the top of the bid function: dynamic and static cases
have the same intercept but diverge at the top. This is because bidders shade down
their bid by the option value of bidding again next period.
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- Case 4 with buyer continuation value and resale has the least steep bid function, i.e. the
price distribution in this case will be the narrowest.
A.2 Optimal Public Reserve Price
So far I have assumed that the seller sets an optimal secret reserve price. This is the
assumption in the main model because in the empirical setting reserve prices are secret.
If the seller can only accept or reject the selling price after bidding has ended, the optimal
cutoff below which to reject the price, is equal to the seller’s value, which is also the
efficient reserve price. The reserve price that maximises the seller’s revenue if that reserve
is public is above the seller’s value as demonstrated in Riley and Samuelson (1981). This
section lays out the same model as above but with this optimal public reserve price.
In the second auction the seller with valuation x maximises their expected payoff by
setting a reserve price r(x) that solves r = x+ 1−F (r)f(r) (Riley and Samuelson, 1981: Prop
3). For x ∼ U [0, 1], r(x) = 12 + x2 . Given reserve price r, the expected payoff for the seller




(af(a) + F (a)− 1)F (a)n−1da− x(1− F (r)n)
Where n is the number of bidders. Using the uniform distribution of valuations, n = 2,




















The reserve price also affects the buyer continuation value. As per Riley and Samuelson




(n−1)(a)da. Since in the first period, the reserve price in the second period
is unknown to the bidders and has the following distribution: Fr(a) = Pr[r < a] =
Pr[12 +
xS
2 < a] = FxS (2x− 1) = (2x− 1)3. The value of continuing into the next auction
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Figure A.4: Bid Functions for Efficient and Optimal Resale
as a bidder becomes:
V (x) = Pr[x > r]Er
[∫ x
r

























x2 + 2x3 − 3x4 + 8
5
x5 ∀x ≥ 1
2
If bidders in the first period take the continuation value of both losing and winning into

















2 − 2312x3 + 3x4 − 85x5, x ≥ 12
Figure A.4 plots the bid functions for the case of resale with an efficient reserve price
(which is the optimal secret reserve) and with an optimal public reserve.
A.3 Aggregate Shocks
Now suppose that each player has valuation sx, where again x ∼ U [0, 1] and s is the same
for all players. x stays the same over time but s is subject to shocks. Assume specifically
that s follows a random walk, i.e. E[s′|s] = s. The value function of a bidder in the second
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Figure A.5: Bid Functions with Aggregate Shock
period becomes:
V (x, s) = Es′
[
Pr[x > max(xS , x






Similarly, S(x, s) = sS(x) and b(x, s) = sb(x). Hence, in case 2 without resale:
b(x, s) = s(x− 1
5
x5)
And in case 4 with resale:
b(x, s) = s(
1
3





As the bid functions make clear, the expected price will depend more strongly on s with
resale than without. The expected price in the first period is
∫ 1
0 b(x)fX(2:3)dx, which
for the case without resale equals 0.48s and for the case with resale equals 0.55s. This
demonstrates analytically in this simplified two-period model why we should expect more
volatile prices in a setting with resale than without, as investigated in the counterfactual
exercise on the estimated model.
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Figure A.6: Bid Functions with Idiosyncratic Shock
(a) Probability shock: p = 0.1 (b) Probability shock: p = 0.3
Notes: Bid Functions with and without resale under idiosyncratic shock, with probability p each bidder’s
valuation drop to 0. Left panel: p = 0.1, right panel: p = 0.5.
A.4 Idiosyncratic Shocks
Now consider a slightly different model where players get payoff x˜ in each period they
hold the object and x˜ equals x with probability (1 − p) and equals 0 with probability p.
A buyer with value x who buys at t = 1 and does not resell at t = 2 thus has expected
payoff equal to x+ (1− p)x. The continuation value as buyer, V˜ (x) depends on whether
the bidder gets shocked, the seller gets shocked, and whether the competitor gets shocked:
V˜ (x) = (1− p)3V (x) + (1− p)
(
p2x+ (1− p)pPr[x > X¯](x−E[X¯|X¯ < x])
+ (1− p)pPr[x > XS ](x−E[XS |XS < x]
)
Where the three terms represent the cases where nobody gets shocked, the bidder does
not get shocked but the competitor and the seller do, only the seller does, and only the
competitor gets shocked. This becomes:








The continuation value as seller, S˜(x), in this model with idiosyncratic shocks is as follows:
S˜(x) = (1− p)3 (Pr[x < X(2:2)]E[X(2:2)|x < X(2:2)] + Pr[x > X(2:2)]x)
+ (1− p) (p2 + 2p(1− p))x+ p(1− p)2E[X(2:2)]
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Where the first term represents the case where nobody gets shocked, the second term
represents the term where the seller does not get shocked and at least one bidder gets
shocked, and the case where the bidder gets shocked but the two bidders do not.
The bid functions without resale and with are then as follows:
bk(x) = x+ (1− p)x− V˜ (x)
b(x) = x+ S˜(x)− V˜ (x)
Figure A.6 plots these two bid functions. As can be seen from the figure there is now
a gap between the two bid functions that persists even for high values of x because also
high-value bidders are subject to shocks and value the possibility of selling after getting
shocked. The larger gap between the bid functions at lower valuations accounts for the
possibility of selling to a bidder with a higher valuation next period, which, without shocks,
is not relevant for bidders with the highest valuations.
B Data
Price Estimate vs Selling Price
Ashenfelter (1989) shows that in his data from wine auctions the correlation between the
price estimate published by the auction house and the selling price is very high. This is
in line with theoretical results in Milgrom and Weber (1982) that it is in the auctioneer’s
interest to provide accurate information about the object at auction. The same result is
true in my data from classic car auctions.
Following Ashenfelter (1989), the price estimate on the X axis of the left graph is the mid-
point of the low and the high estimate published by the auction houses for each auction.
The graph is restricted to cars with a predicted price below USD 1 Million. For these cars
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on the graph the correlation between the price estimate and the selling price is 0.95. For
all cars the correlation is 0.97. The right graph is restricted to cars with a low estimate
between USD 1 Million.
Regression Classic Car Returns on S&P 500 Returns
The following table shows the regression output corresponding to figure 2.1b. The depen-
dent variable is the return on classic cars calculated as the change in the deflated annual
average price on classic cars in Orsi and Gazzi (2017). The definition in the book of a
year is from September of that year until the following August. The single explanatory
variable is the annual return of the S&P 500 according to the book’s definition of a year.
The sample is years 1994-2016 (year 1993 being lost in calculating the return).
Dependent Variable: Return on Classic Cars
Intercept 0.247
(0.23)
S&P Average Annual Return 0.776
(0.211)
N 23
(Standard errors in parantheses)
Year Fixed Effects Regression
The following table shows the regression output corresponding to figure 2.1c (left column)
and 2.1d (columns 2-5). The dependent variable is the log deflated sale price from the
auction level data. The explanatory variables are fixed effects for years 2004-2016 and a
fixed effect for each model in the data. The sample is all auctions in years 2003-2016 for
the left column and all auctions for cars of the respective brand in years 2003-2016 for
columns 2-5.
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Dependent Variable: Log Price
All Ferrari Jaguar Porsche Mercedes
Intercept 12.569 9.154 10.159 11.559 10.357
(0.346) (0.278) (0.348) (0.323) (0.127)
Auction Year 2004 0.072 0.106 0.238 0.106 0.046
(0.052) (0.141) (0.125) (0.157) (0.124)
Auction Year 2005 0.262 0.414 0.296 0.43 0.228
(0.053) (0.154) (0.127) (0.189) (0.127)
Auction Year 2006 0.368 0.386 0.477 0.336 0.531
(0.051) (0.134) (0.137) (0.143) (0.128)
Auction Year 2007 0.515 0.627 0.521 0.579 0.637
(0.053) (0.144) (0.138) (0.166) (0.147)
Auction Year 2008 0.585 0.898 0.627 0.707 0.664
(0.05) (0.13) (0.145) (0.163) (0.132)
Auction Year 2009 0.401 0.603 0.328 0.564 0.392
(0.049) (0.13) (0.117) (0.16) (0.134)
Auction Year 2010 0.497 0.745 0.358 0.551 0.664
(0.047) (0.13) (0.112) (0.155) (0.123)
Auction Year 2011 0.566 0.834 0.387 0.757 0.822
(0.048) (0.127) (0.118) (0.158) (0.122)
Auction Year 2012 0.661 1.037 0.444 0.762 0.934
(0.049) (0.129) (0.127) (0.161) (0.124)
Auction Year 2013 0.84 1.346 0.455 0.825 1.2
(0.049) (0.127) (0.128) (0.157) (0.119)
Auction Year 2014 0.995 1.631 0.639 1.061 1.331
(0.049) (0.129) (0.126) (0.157) (0.119)
Auction Year 2015 1.085 1.705 0.787 1.137 1.405
(0.049) (0.126) (0.123) (0.15) (0.121)
Auction Year 2016 1.018 1.645 0.726 1.12 1.29
(0.051) (0.128) (0.135) (0.154) (0.125)
Model FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4554 671 480 477 399
(Standard errors in parantheses)
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Regression with model-year-built fixed effect.
The definition of a model in the regressions above is the model of car regardless of the
year built. In the below graphs and table are the results for the same regressions but
controlling for a model-year-built fixed effect, i.e. defining the model as the model built
in a specific year. The results are very similar for all brands together. For the brands
separately, for Porsche and Mercedes-Benz the rate of growth changes but the pattern
remains very similar.
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Dependent Variable: Log Price
All Ferrari Jaguar Porsche Mercedes
Intercept 12.499 9.366 10.228 11.357 10.112
(0.319) (0.305) (0.346) (0.353) (0.194)
Auction Year 2004 0.054 -0.088 0.14 0.208 0.213
(0.06) (0.167) (0.149) (0.188) (0.147)
Auction Year 2005 0.274 0.202 0.228 0.61 0.405
(0.062) (0.202) (0.157) (0.243) (0.145)
Auction Year 2006 0.366 0.224 0.436 0.625 0.705
(0.062) (0.175) (0.18) (0.206) (0.158)
Auction Year 2007 0.585 0.43 0.471 0.98 0.839
(0.06) (0.18) (0.166) (0.222) (0.17)
Auction Year 2008 0.562 0.736 0.336 0.992 0.948
(0.057) (0.165) (0.181) (0.216) (0.165)
Auction Year 2009 0.406 0.466 0.258 0.821 0.627
(0.055) (0.164) (0.134) (0.218) (0.171)
Auction Year 2010 0.465 0.565 0.285 0.818 0.854
(0.054) (0.165) (0.127) (0.2) (0.154)
Auction Year 2011 0.513 0.649 0.201 0.938 1.002
(0.055) (0.16) (0.139) (0.201) (0.157)
Auction Year 2012 0.619 0.824 0.374 0.957 1.067
(0.056) (0.164) (0.145) (0.208) (0.155)
Auction Year 2013 0.823 1.208 0.392 1.027 1.421
(0.056) (0.159) (0.147) (0.202) (0.157)
Auction Year 2014 0.958 1.459 0.519 1.27 1.55
(0.057) (0.162) (0.148) (0.207) (0.157)
Auction Year 2015 1.069 1.539 0.675 1.376 1.586
(0.056) (0.16) (0.14) (0.201) (0.158)
Auction Year 2016 0.987 1.462 0.664 1.362 1.506
(0.059) (0.162) (0.156) (0.203) (0.161)
Model-Year-built FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4554 671 480 477 399
(Standard errors in parantheses)
Total Volume
The following two graphs show the annual number of classic cars offered and sold through




Linear Composite Good Consumption Function
The intertemporal budget constraint in the economy is given by equation (2.2). Ignoring
car trade and focusing on composite good consumption ci,t, in the special case without
additive income (mi+i,t = 0), it is straightforward to show that the optimal consumption
function is linear, namely ci,t = ψyi,t−1. In this case the intertemporal budget constraint
becomes
yi,t = (1 + rt)yi,t−1 − ci,t
yi,t ≥ 0
Define a new variable wi,t−1 = (1+rt)yi,t−1, the agent’s problem can then be characterized
as
V (wi,t−1) = max
ci,t,yi,t,wi,t
U(ci,t) + βE[V (wi,t)] s.t. ci,t = wi,t−1 − yi,t
wi,t−1 = (1 + rt)yi,t−1
wi,0 given
Rewrite:
V (wi,t−1) = max
yi,t
U(wi,t−1 − yi,t) + βE[V ((1 + ri,t+1)yi,t)]
This problem admits the following Euler equation:
U ′(ci,t) = βE[U ′(ci,t+1)(1 + ri,t+1)]
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Now use U(ci,t) = log(ci,t) and guess ci,t = ψwi,t−1.
This guess implies that wi,t = (1 + ri,t+1)yi,t = (1 + ri,t+1)(1− ψ)wi,t−1.






















ψ(1 + rt)(1− ψ)wi,t−1
]
ψ = 1− β
Hence the guess is verified and we have a linear consumption function.
For the case with additive income, i.e.
yi,t = mi + (1 + rt)yi,t−1 − ci,t + i,t
yi,t ≥ 0







I rely on this result and use c(y) = ψy as a good enough approximation to the exact
solution for the model.
Wealth Process
Ignoring car trade, the wealth process 2.2 is a so-called Kesten Process, see Benhabib and
Bisin (2018): p.17. This is a stationary process with the following stationary distribution:














(1 + rt−k − ψ)
)
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The first two moments of the aggregate wealth distribution will be as follows:
















































































The second line of the variance derivation, follows because (i) rt is constant over i and
(ii) because Var(XY ) = E(X2Y 2) − (EXY )2 = EX2EY 2 − (EXEY )2 = Var(X)E(Y 2)
if X, Y are independent and E(X) = 0.
Calculation Value Functions
Given the intertemporal budget constraint (2.2) and the state transition determined by





Pr(r′ = r(y¯, y¯′))
∫










Pr(r′ = r(y¯, y¯′))
∫

Bˆj(m+ (1− ψ + r′)y + ′, y¯′)dF






Pr(r′ = r(y¯, y¯′))
∫







Pr(r′ = r(y¯, y¯′))
∫








j,s,y. Superscript (1) indicates the first iteration. j, s, y indicate grid-
points in the 3-dimensional tensors. The dimensions are the car types, the state mean
wealth, and private wealth. I use the following grid for mean wealth:
(2.6, 3, 3.4, 3.6, 3.8, 4, 4.2, 4.4, 4.8, 5.2, 5.6) in USD millions. Private wealth is on a grid from
0.1 to 20.1 in increments of 0.1, all in USD millions.
Next, interpolate over y grid and obtain B
(1)
j,s (y) and S
(1)






Then, for p ∈ {1, 2, ..., P}:
- Calculate the bid function as follows: b
(p)
j,s,y = y − (S(p)j,s (B(p)j,s (y)− wj/β))−1








- Calculate Bˆj,s,y as follows (here and below
∫







j,s,y > max(b¯, aj))(wj + βS
(p)
j,s (y − b¯))
+ 1(b
(p)
















j,s (y + b¯)) + 1(a
(p)









j,s,y to get Bˆ
(p)








j,s,y = ln(ψy) + (1− σ)β
∑
s′

















































j,s,y to get B
(p+1)




Initialise wealth distribution y1 = {yti}Ni=1 to empirical distribution. Randomly pick
sellers among initially richest agents. Then for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}:
- Determine state as mean of yt
- Randomly pick active bidders from buyers (all agents who are not sellers)
- Calculate bids according to b
(p)
j,s,y and wealth of active bidders
- Store second highest bid b¯tj for each car
- Pick one random seller for each car
- Calculate reserve price atj for each car according to a
(p)
j,s,y and store
- Find preliminary wealth distribution yt+1 by drawing rt and {i,t}Ni=1
- If b¯tj > a
t
j , adjust list of sellers and adjust y
t+1 of winners and previous sellers by
selling prices
This yields {b¯tj}Tt=1 and {atj}Tt=1. Calculate state for each t and make list of b¯tj and atj
for each state. Draw randomly from that list for each state to get G
(p+1)





- Sample: Households in the 85th to 99th percentiles in terms of both income and wealth
in the SCF (Survey of Consumer Finances)
- mi: Income in 2001 because wealth in 2001 is closest to average income in the sample
period 2003-2016.
- rt: Average annual return on the S&P500.
- i,t: For the idiosyncratic shock i,t I need an individual mean-zero change over one year.
I therefore use the de-meaned change in income from the SCF panel 2007-09 (the only
panel there is) and divide by two to calibrate i,t.
- s: The share of wealth invested in the stock market is chosen to be s = 0.5.
- ψ: For the share of wealth spent on the composite good each period, simulate (2.2) for a
grid of possible values of ψ and choose this parameter so that it minimises the distance
between the average wealth over households and time in the simulation and over the
sample period. This yields ψ = 0.09.
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Prices by State
1. Calculate year fixed effects.
























Pˆ trendj,t − Pˆ trendj,0 = βtrendj · t+ j,t
Pˆj,t = Pˆ
trend






5. Match to state by simulated mean wealth over sample period.
The following graphs show the estimated wealth distribution for mean wealth (state)
3.0, 3.8, and 4.8:
The following graphs graphs plot the income distribution, the distribution of the idiosyn-
cratic shock, and the distribution of the net return:
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The following graphs show the output of the wealth simulation, on the left the simu-
lated mean and the second-highest wealth among active bidders, and on the right three
examples of simulated individual wealth paths.
D.1 Rescaled Model for Estimation
Let A be the number of auctions per year. Then:
Per-period discount rate β˜ = β1/A.
ψ˜ = 1− (1− ψ)1/A.
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Pr(r′ = r(y¯, y¯′))
∫




















Pr(r′ = r(y¯, y¯′))
∫

Bˆj(m+ (1− ψ + sr′)y + ′, y¯′)dF
E Counterfactuals
Summary Statistics Predicted Prices
Prices for Ferrari:
State With Resale No Resale
Mean SD Mean SD
3.0 0.77 0.12 0.69 0.17
3.4 0.86 0.13 0.78 0.19
3.6 0.91 0.15 0.83 0.21
3.8 0.95 0.14 0.87 0.2
4.0 0.99 0.13 0.92 0.21
4.2 1.05 0.16 0.96 0.23
4.4 1.13 0.17 1.03 0.25
4.8 1.21 0.18 1.1 0.25
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Estimates assuming no resale









(Bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses)
Predicted Prices baseline and centralized trade











(Bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses)
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F Appendix to Information in Sequential Auctions
F.1 Distributions of Order Statistics
For reference, below are the distributions of the order statistics used below. Let X be a
random variable with CDF F (·). Let X(i:n) be the ith largest among n draws from X. Let
X1, X2, and X3 be independent draws from X. The distribution of the order statistics
used here is then as follows:
FX(1:2)(x) = Pr[X(1:2) < x]
= Pr[X1 < x ∩X2 < x]
= F (x)2
fX(1:2)(x) = 2F (x)f(x)
FX(2:2)(x) = Pr[X(2:2) < x]
= Pr[(X1 < x ∩X2 < x) ∪ (X1 < x ∩X2 > x) ∪ (X1 > x ∩X2 < x))]
= FX(1:2)(x) + 2Pr[(X1 < x ∩X2 > x)]
= F (x)2 + 2F (x)(1− F (x))
fX(2:2)(x) = 2f(x)(1− F (x))
FX(1:2)X(2:2)(x, y) = Pr[X(1:2) < x ∩X(2:2) < y] x > y
= Pr[X(1:2) < y] + Pr[y < X(1:2) < x ∩X(2:2) < y]
= Pr[X(1:2) < y] + 2Pr[y < X1 < x ∩X2 < y]
= FX(1:2)(y) + 2F (y)(F (x)− F (y))
fX(1:2)X(2:2)(x, y) = 2f(x)f(y)
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FX(2:3)(x) = Pr[X1 < x ∩X2 < x ∩X3 < x] + 3Pr[X1 < x ∩X2 < x ∩X3 > x]
= F (x)3 + 3F (x)2(1− F (x))
fX(2:3)(x) = 6F (x)f(x)(1− F (x))
FX(3:3)(x) = FX(2:3)(x) + 3Pr[X1 < x ∩X2 > x ∩X3 > x]
= F (x)3 + 3F (x)2(1− F (x)) + 3F (x)(1− F (x))2
fX(3:3)(x) = 3f(x)(1− F (x))2
FX(2:3)X(3:3)(x, y) = FX(2:3)(y) + Pr[X(3:3) < y ∩ y < x(2:3) < x]
= FX(2:3)(y) + 3Pr[X1 < y ∩ y < X(2:2) < x]
= FX(2:3)(y) + 3F (y)(FX(2:2)(x)− FX(2:2)(y))
fX(2:3)X(3:3)(x, y) = 3f(y)fX(2:2)(x)
= 6f(x)f(y)(1− F (x))
F.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1




















































fX(1:2)X(2:2)(X(1:2) = x, x(2:2))dx(2:2) = 0
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Then:






fX(1:2)X(2:2)(X(1:2) = x, x(2:2))dx(2:2)
Solve for bW (x):





) fX(1:2)X(2:2)(X(1:2) = x, x(2:2))
fX(1:2)(X(1:2) = x)
dx(2:2)
= E[X(2:2)|X(1:2) = x] (F.13)
Finally:























= E[X|X < x] (F.14)
Monotonicity of bW (x) is thus confirmed. Anticipating the equilibrium in which all bidders
bid b2(x) = x in the second period, the first period thus has a unique equilibrium in which
all bidders play bW (x). Since b2(x) is the unique symmetric equilibrium in the second
period, (bW (x), b2(x)) is the unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
Proof of Proposition 2
























































= x− F (x)(x−E[X|X < x]) (F.15)
Monotonicity of bS(x) is thus confirmed. Anticipating the equilibrium in which all bidders
bid b2(x) = x in the second period, the first period thus has a unique equilibrium in which
all bidders play bS(x). Since b2(x) is the unique symmetric equilibrium in the second
period, (bS(x), b2(x)) is the unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose the equilibrium holds at t + 1 and that there is an increasing equilibrium in all










1B>bt(x(t:M))(x− bt(x(t:M))) + 1B<bt(x(t:M))1x>x(t+1:M)(x− bt+1(x(t+1:M))) + ...
+ 1B<bt(x(t:M))1x<x(t+1:M) ...1x>x(M :M)(x− x(M :M))
)






















1x>x(t+1:M)(x− bt+1(x(t+1:M))) + ...
+ 1x<x(t+1:M) ...1x>x(M :M)(x− x(M :M))
)














fX(t:M)X(t+1:M)...X(M :M)(x(t:M) = b
−1











1x>x(t+1:M)(x− bt+1(x(t+1:M))) + ...
+ 1x<x(t+1:M) ...1x>x(M :M)(x− x(M :M))
)
fX(t:M)X(t+1:M)...X(M :M)(x(t:M) = b
−1
t (B), x(t+1:M), ..., x(M :M))dx(t+1:M)...x(M :M)














1x>x(t+1:M)(x− bt+1(x(t+1:M))) + ...
+ 1x<x(t+1:M) ...1x>x(M :M)(x− x(M :M))
)









1x>x(t+1:M)(x− bt+1(x(t+1:M))) + ...
+ 1x<x(t+1:M) ...1x>x(M :M)(x− x(M :M))
)
fX(t:M)X(t+1:M)...X(M :M)(x(t:M) = x, x(t+1:M), ..., x(M :M))dx(t+1:M)...x(M :M)
Note that
fX(t:M)X(t+1:M)...X(M :M)(x(t:M) = x, x(t+1:M), ..., x(M :M))
fX(t:M)(x)
= fX(t+1:M)...X(M :M)|X(t:M)=x(x(t+1:M), ..., x(M :M))
Conditional on X(t:M) = x, 1x<x(t+1:M) = 0 and so inside the integral above all summation
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fX(t+1:M)...X(M :M)|X(t:M)=x(x(t+1:M), ..., x(M :M))dx(t+1:M)...x(M :M)
=E[x− bt+1(X(t+1:M))|X(t:M) = x]
=x−E[E[XM :M |Xt+1:M ]|X(t:M) = x]
=x−E[XM :M |X(t:M) = x]
Monotonicity is thus verified. The unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium is for
all players to play E[XM :M |X(t:M) = x] in all periods t = 1, ...,M .
Proof of Proposition 4
Conjecture that all bidders play an increasing bid function in every period (verify later). A
continuing bidder will face an entering bidder next period whose value is random variable
X. Suppose the equilibrium holds at t = M − s + 1 (proof by backward induction) and
that the entering bidder at t = M − s plays the bid function bt(·). The value of continuing





(x−bM−s(x1))f(x1)dx1 +(1−F (b−1M−s(B)))VM−s(x) (F.16)











VM−s(x) = 0 (F.17)
Solving and setting B = bM−s(x):
bM−s(x) = x− VM−s(x) (F.18)
The entering bidder solves a similar but not identical objective. The entering bidder will
face a continuing player coming into auction t. Denote the value of the continuing bidder at






(x− bM−s(xtc))fX(t:t)(xtc)dxtc + (1− FX(t:t)(b−1M−s(B)))VM−s(x) (F.19)
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As can be seen from the first order condition (F.17), (F.18) is going to solve (F.19) also.
Since we know from Proposition 2 that the proposed bid function is the equilibrium strat-
egy at t = M − 1, it now follows by backward induction that it is also going to be the
equilibrium strategy for all t = M−1,M−2, ..., 1. Plugging (F.18) into (F.16) yields (3.9).
Since Vt(x) < x, the bid function is increasing in every period. The unique symmetric
subgame perfect equilibrium is for all players to play x− Vt(x) in all periods t = 1, ...,M .
Proof of proposition 6:





















1x>x(t+1:M)β(x− bt+1(x(t+1:M))) + ...
+ 1x<x(t+1:M) ...1x>x(M :M)β
M−t(x− x(M :M))
)













fX(t:M)X(t+1:M)...X(M :M)(x(t:M) = b
−1











1x>x(t+1:M)β(x− bt+1(x(t+1:M))) + ...
+ 1x<x(t+1:M) ...1x>x(M :M)β
M−t(x− x(M :M))
)
fX(t:M)X(t+1:M)...X(M :M)(x(t:M) = b
−1
t (B), x(t+1:M), ..., x(M :M))dx(t+1:M)...x(M :M)











fX(t+1:M)...X(M :M)|X(t:M)=x(x(t+1:M), ..., x(M :M))dx(t+1:M)...x(M :M)
=E[β(x− bt+1(X(t+1:M)))|X(t:M) = x]
=β(x−E[E[XM :M |Xt+1:M ]|X(t:M) = x])
=β(x−E[XM :M |X(t:M) = x])
96
Proof of Proposition 7
As before, the value of the continuing player coming into auction t, denoted by Xtc, follows
the distribution of the order statistic X(t:t). Suppose the equilibrium holds at t = M−s+1
(proof by backward induction) and that the continuing bidder at t = M − s plays the bid





(x− bM−s(xtc))fX(t:t)(xtc)dxtc + β(1− FX(t:t)(b−1M−s(B)))VM−s(x)





(x− bM−s(x1))f(x1)dx1 + β(1− F (b−1M−s(B)))VM−s(x)
Following the same steps as above, both of these are maximised at:
bM−s(x) = x− βVM−s(x)
F.3 Prices in the two-period case
Second-period price
Proposition 8. In both the Weber and the stationary model the expected second-period
price P2 equals the expected value of X(3:3), the lowest among three draws from X:
E[P2] = E[X(3:3)] (F.20)
Proof. In both models the unique symmetric equilibrium in the second period is for both
active players to submit a bid equal to b2(x) = x. The bidder with valuation X(3:3), the
lowest among all three players’ valuations, will be present in the second auction in both
models and will submit the lower of the two second-period bids. The price in the second
price auction will therefore be determined by this bidder. Therefore, E[P2] = E[b2(X(3:3))],
and since b2(x) = x, the proposition follows.
First-period price in the Weber model
Proposition 9. In the Weber model the expected first-period price PW equals the expected
value of X(3:3), the lowest among three draws from X:
E[PW ] = E[X(3:3)] (F.21)
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Proof. In the Weber model all three bidders are active in the first auction. Therefore the
first period price PW is determined by the bidder with the second highest valuation from
three draws, i.e. by X(2:3). Using the equilibrium bid function bW (x), the proposition
follows:
E[PW ] = E[bW (X(2:3))]
= EX(2:3) [E[X|X < X(2:3)]]
= E[X(3:3)]
First-Period Price in the Stationary Model
Proposition 10. In the stationary model the expected first-period price PS equals the
expected value of X(3:3), the lowest among three draws from X:
E[PS ] = E[X(3:3)] (F.22)
Proof. In the stationary model two randomly drawn bidders are present in the first auction
and so the first-period price is determined by the bidder with lower valuation among two
draws, i.e. by X(2:2). Using the equilibrium bid function bS(x) and the distributions of
the order statistic X(2:2), the proposition follows:































Where the fourth line follows from the fact that F (x)fX(2:2)(x) =
1
3fX(2:3)(x) and (1 −
F (x))fX(2:2)(x) =
2
3fX(3:3)(x), see distributions in F.1.
F.4 Bid Functions for Uniformly Distributed Values








For the stationary model they are:
bM = x,
bM−1 = x− 12x2,
bM−2 = x− x2 + 13x3,
bM−3 = x− 32x2 + x3 − 14x4,
bM−4 = x− 2x2 + 2x3 − x4 + 15x5,
bM−5 = x− 52x2 = 103 x3 − 52x4 + x5 − 16x6.
See figure 3.2.
F.5 Alternative Derivation of Equilibrium
Weber Model
The equilibrium stated in Weber (1983) theorem 3b is the following:
bW (x) = E[X(3:3)|X(2:3) = x]
Note first of all that this is equal to the bid function derived above, since similarly to the
second equality in (3.2), it turns out that:






















= E[X|X < x]
The following derives this expression of the equilibrium assuming values are uniformly
distributed on [0, 1].
Conjecture a monotone equilibrium bid function bW (x) at t = 1. At t = 2 the remaining
active bidders will then have values X(2:3) and X(3:3). The bidder with value X(2:3) will
win the auction and pay X(3:3) (since both players bid their respective value at t = 2). If
the equlibrium winner of round two were instead to buy at t = 1, the value of doing so
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would be not having to pay the expected price at t = 2, i.e. E[X(3:3)|X(2:3) = x]. The
equilibrium bid at t = 1 is equal to this value:





Where the second line follows from assuming a uniform distribution of values on [0, 1].
Consider a bid b′(x) < bW (x). This deviation from the equilibrium bid will make a
difference to payoffs only if x is the largest among three draws from X, i.e. if x = X(1:3),
and if b′(x) < bW (X(2:3)). In equilibrium the highest-value bidder wins the first auction
and receives payoff x minus the bid of the second-highest value bidder:
EU(x = X(1:3)) = x−EX(2:3) [b1(x(2:3))|X(1:3) = x]
= x−EX(2:3) [E[X(3:3)|X(2:3)]|X(1:3) = x]
= x−E[X(3:3)|X(1:3) = x]
Where the third equality follows from the law of iterated expectation. Deviating to a low
enough bid results in the bidder with x = X(1:3) winning the second period and paying
the bid of the bidder with the third largest valuation:
EU ′(x = X(1:3)) = x−E[X(3:3)|X(1:3) = x]
Hence the expected payoff from deviating to any bid b′(x) < b1(x) is the same as the
equilibrium payoff in all scenarios.
Consider a bid b′′(x) > bW (x). This will make a difference to payoffs only if x = X(2:3) or
x = X(3:3) and if b
′′(x) > bW (X(1:3)). In equilibrium the bidder with x = X(2:3) wins at
t = 2 and their expected payoff is:






The bidder with x = X(3:3) on the other hand in equilibrium wins neither auction in
equilibrium:
EU(x = X(3:3)) = 0
Now consider the payoffs from instead outbidding the highest-value bidder in the first
period.


















Note that EU ′′(x = X(2:3)) < EU(x = X(2:3)) ∀x < 1. The lowest-value bidder could
however sometimes gain from deviating:















The relevant tradeoff is whether a deviation has higher payoff in expectation:
























< 0 ∀x < 1
Hence deviating to a bid b′′(x) > bW (x) is never profitable in expectation. bW (x) = 12x
and b2(x) = x is an SPNE of this game (and monotonicity is confirmed).
Stationary Model
In the stationary model the loser from the first round faces a new bidder in the second
round who has not been active before. The valuation of the new entrant is drawn from
X. Assume again that X ∼ U [0, 1]. The realised value of the entrant may be above
or below the valuation of the continuing bidder. When trading off buying at t = 1
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against continuing, bidders have therefore to take into account the probability of facing
a competitor with a higher valuation at t = 2. The value of buying at t = 1 is then the
valuation of the object minus the expected value of continuing into the second period.
Bidders bid this value:
bS(x) = x− Pr[X < x](x−E[X|X < x])






Consider a deviation to a bid b′(x) < bS(x) when other bidders are playing the equilibrium
strategy. This will make a difference to payoffs only if the bidder has the higher value
among the two bidders active in the first auction, i.e. if x = X(1:2). The equilibrium payoff
to the highest value bidder is:














































If by deviating to a lower bid the highest-value bidder from t = 1 continues into the second
period, the new entrant may have a higher or a lower value. The expected payoff from
deviating is thus:





Note that having had the highest draw of valuations in the first period does not provide
the bidder with any information about their probability of winning in the second period.
Note also that for all x < 1, EU(x = X(1:2)) > EU
′(x = X(1:2)). Hence this is never a
profitable deviation.
Consider a deviation to a bid b′′(x) > bS(x) when the other bidders are playing the
strategy bS(x). Such a deviation will change payoffs only if x = X(2:2). This bidder will
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in equilibrium continue to the second period and have the following expected payoff:





If deviating to outbid the bidder with the higher valuation, the payoff will be:


















































































)(1− x)2 < 0
Hence bS(x) = x − 12x2 and b2(x) = x is an SPNE of this game (and monotonicity is
confirmed).
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